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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation consists of three papers in the area of international market analysis, as 
Usted in chapter 1, 2, and 3. Each paper has its own issue and application, but the main 
theme behind these papers is to figure out the interactions of intemational firms' real 
decisions with respect to changes in financial variables or structure attributing to the firms' 
behaviors. Chapter 1, the first paper, deals with the interaction between real diversification 
and currency hedging, under the dual uncertainty sources of exchange rate and price itself. 
The second paper. Chapter 2, is about another risk-diversification model, developed within 
the fi-amework of the capital-asset-piice-model (CAPM). The third paper. Chapter 3, 
approaches the issue of'incomplete passthrough' of exchange rate in terms of the competitive 
pressure faced by foreign oligopoly, and shows how the firm's price leadership affects 
exchange rate pass-through. Following the third chapter is a general review of conclusions. 
Overview 
The first paper relates the real decision with the role of hedging tool(s) for currency 
risk. Given the importance of stabilizing the fluctuation in exchange rates, most of previous 
hedging literature have examined the positive role of hedging to the real decision, either 
imports or exports, under currency uncertainty. The main issue of this article focuses on the 
interactions between two risk managing strategies, diversification and currency hedging, 
especially on the production or total import level. Existence of hedging tools would be 
beneficial for a decision-maker: transferring the associated risk directly to the market 
speculators, and thus would affect real decisions positively. 
Import diversification should be considered a reaUstic approach since there are many 
instances when firms import one of their inputs, which might be a homogeneous product or 
products within the same group, from multiple suppliers of different nationalities. However, 
there are no relevant hedging instruments for product price variation except diversification. 
The major objective of this paper is to show that the effectiveness of engaging in futures 
market depends on the degree that the relevant exchange rates are correlated or affected by 
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the market-wide systematic risk. The paper offers several interesting findings driven from 
the model. 
Chapter 2 provides one way to apply the portfoUo approach similar to the CAPM to the 
real decision of demand diversification, and uses the approach in an application in 
international trade. Further, the paper is especially designed to justify the diversification 
behavior of a risk-averse buyer of products, which are not necessarily homogenous, under 
price imcertainty. It first theoretically examines the relationships among the key variables 
of the model, such as the expected price, the systematic risk of price, and also the 
monopolistic market power of the suppliers in the market. 
The major testable implications drawn are as follows; first, the monopolistic market 
power of a suppUer positively affects the systematic risk of the price, and thus adversely 
affects the negative relationship between the expected price and its risk, similar to the 
CAPM. Secondly, the systematic price risk relative to the optimal market portfolio can be 
decomposed into the net risk measure and a residual term due to the market power. Based 
on these impUcations, the Chinese wheat import market is empirically examined to justify its 
diversification behavior over the sample period. The results generally shows that the 
portfolio approach, while controlling the monopolistic power effect, shall be an useful 
methodology in explaining potential conflicts between the buyer's risk diversification efforts 
and the suppliers' market power. 
The last paper of the dissertation. Chapter 3, relates the topic of exchange rate pass-
through - which refers to the partial response of import prices to nominal exchange rates- to 
the industrial structure of an exporting firm, especially to the barometric price leadership in 
the industry. Recent study of the subject have drawn heavily on models of industrial 
organization and focused on the impact of maricet structure on the foreign firm's behavior. 
In particular, existing literature emphasizes the convexity of demand schedules in explaining 
pricing adjustments following exchange rate changes. To find the nature of the convexity, 
current literature has concerned on the specific industry structure, such as degree of 
competition, product substitutabihty, market quantity shares, or the degree of destination-
specific production. 
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The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, based on an adapted Dixit-Stiglitz model, 
it theoretically draws testable implications on the subject. The model shows how pass-
through is affected by barometric price leadership: pass-through tends to be greater for a firm 
that the market perceives its price changes to be exogenous to the market price (p*), followed 
by the firm of p*-leader, than that of p*-taker. Overall, pass-through is negatively affected 
by the firm's markup factors attributing the degree of competitive pressure faced by the firm; 
e.g., in addition to the price interactions, pass-through is negatively related to the relative 
price to p*, and positively related to the degree of product substitutability. 
Second, this paper offers an empirical example, focusing on price interactions, of 
import beer pricing behavior in the US during 1979 to 1988, where the sample period is 
known as two distinctive and prolonged eras of US dollar appreciation and depreciation. As 
a diagnostic step, we first performed a VAR analysis to figure out the barometric leadership. 
Because there are open debates over the stability of pass-through level, the Kalman Filter 
methodology is used to investigate potential structural changes in parameters, and thus to 
capture dynamics of pass-through, as well as of other elasticities. Coefficients are generally 
estimated in the way predicted in the theoretical section, and are mostly stable over the 
sample period, thus supporting our model. 
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CHAPTER 1. IMPORT DIVERSIFICATION 
AND CURRENCY HEDGING 
A paper prepared to be submitted to the Journal of Futures Market 
Jeong-Yun Seo 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines interactions between diversification strategy and currency 
hedging when a competitive & risk-averse importing agent chooses optimal import quantities 
and hedging levels under price uncertainty. Exchange rate and input price are the dual 
uncertainty sources of stochastic import prices. The resulting total import level under both 
schemes depends significantly on the degree of correlation among relevant currencies, 
because it is the existence of currency hedging that determines the covariance effect of 
portfolio variance. Both real and hedging decisions must be made within the portfolio 
framework (i.e., they are non-separable), and any change in the degree of closeness in 
stochastic price movements always affects the diversification incentive of the firm. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Firms involved in international trade are subject to fluctuations in exchange rates as 
well as price uncertainty itself. Many of the internationally traded commodities do not have 
derivative markets as means to stabilize fluctuations in associated prices, but the major 
currencies are traded both in futures and forwards markets. Previous literature (e.g.. Wolf: 
1995) stresses benefits of engaging in currency futures contracts. The existence of 
derivative markets, unless the subjective specxilation in futures markets is significantly 
downward biased towards a reduction in an agent's expected return, reduces the risk that the 
firm faces, and leads to a higher production or trade level as the firm's ex-ante welfare level 
increases. This smdy theoretically investigates a risk-averse intemational firm's production, 
import diversification, and hedging decisions imder import price uncertainty, where price 
itself and exchange rate provide the joint sources of uncertainty. Thus, in addition to 
hedging the relevant currency variations through futures contracts, this study includes 
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another feasible and realistic strategy, the use of diversified channels for importing 
homogeneous products fi-om multiple countries. 
A group of countries such as Spain, Taiwan, Korea, Israel and others are recently 
considering or have started the introduction of financial futures markets, like index futures 
and foreign currency futures, to allow hedging. The problem of managing the risk outside 
home country is important to many countries, especially when the foreign trade sector is a 
significant component of the coimtry's economy (e.g., Dombusch; 1987). Given the 
importance of stabilizing the fluctuation in exchange rates, most of previous hedging 
literature have examined the positive role of hedging to the real decision, either imports or 
exports, imder currency uncertainty. The major focus of the literature is to figure out the 
degree of risk reduction and the degree of appropriate use of hedging tool(s) (i.e., optimal 
hedge ratio). Examining the separation property between real and hedging decisions is 
critical since it deals with the degree of risk reduction in the firm's profit by participating in 
an appropriate hedging device, which in turn affects the real decisions. 
Neglecting the basis risk, the complete separation will be in general achieved if there 
exists direct hedging tool(s) for the corresponding risk exposed (See Kawai and Zilcha: 1986 
for the full double hedging theorem), even in the multi-period firamework (Donoso: 1995). 
Non-separation, on the other hand, will result with existence of basis risk (for instance, 
Paroush and Wolf: 1992), or with an indirect or cross hedging device (Broil et al.: 1995; 
Broil and Wahl: 1996). Regardless of the degree of separation, the real decisions are 
positively affected by the inclusion of the hedging tool(s) in a significant manner, as the risk 
level reduces, given the reasonable speculation values in the futures market(s). 
The main issue of this article is on the interactions between two risk managing 
strategies, diversification and currency hedging, especially on the production or total import 
level. Existence of hedging tools would be beneficial for a decision-maker by transferring 
the associated risk directly to the market speculators, thereby affecting real decisions 
positively. None of the previous papers has, however, considered the possibility of engaging 
in hedging devices involving multiple export or import channels. Diversification is another 
way to reduce the total variance of the end-of-period profit by eliminating, at least parts of, 
unsystematic risk. It should be also considered as a realistic approach since there are many 
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instances when firms import one of their inputs that might be a homogeneous product or 
products within the same group, from multiple suppliers of different nationalities. However, 
there are no relevant hedging instruments for the product price variation except 
diversification. To cite a few examples, we may think of steel imports for auto industry, 
memory chips for computer industry, or coal imports for energy industry (Wolak and 
Kolstad: 1991). Note that engaging in cross-hedging, if available, could yield another 
problem of inaccurate estimation, or specifically a serious basis risk, if the commodity used 
for the hedging is not a very close-substitute (Eaker and Grant: 1987). 
The findings of this article show that the introduction of currency hedging tool doesn't 
eliminate the firm's incentive to diversify, given the different role of two strategies in the 
total risk reduction. The separation of real and hedging decisions would not be achieved 
without direct hedging tool(s) for all exposed risk source(s) (e.g., Kerkvliet and Moffett: 
1991). Non-separation is also the case of this article even under unbiased fiitures structure 
and without basis risk as long as real diversification is involved. Due to the interaction 
between two strategies, the resulting total imports of a firm (or an industry) can be 
substantially different, depending on the relevant exchange rates structure of the product 
suppUers. If the stochastic movements of suppliers' currencies are little (highly) correlated, 
then the total real effect by introducing financial hedging tools will be small (large). It has 
been shown that the availability of hedging does not necessarily induce a higher trade level 
than under the diversification strategy alone, imless the import purchase is made by a single 
currency (e.g., US dollars). These different outcomes occur since the hedging either 
increases or reduces the covariance effect (i.e., 'bowing' property or the convexity to the 
expected return axis) of portfolio variance in the efficient frontier. 
Import prices are the only uncertainty' that a risk-averse intemational firm faces, but 
there are dual stochastic price sources, input price itself and exchange rate, in the model. 
Following Wolf, the sources are assumed to be independent with each other in the 
multiplicative form. Thus the model doesn't consider any potential price discrimination of 
suppUers through exchange rate movements (e.g., 'pricing-to-market', Krugman: 1986). In 
other words, this paper is limited to the context of homogeneous input imports, and thus a 
single output, to focus on the combined effects of diversification of imports and the currency 
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hedging. Import diversification is our case, but the findings of this article should be 
applicable to an exporting firm, since the importer's decision problem is basically the same 
as the exporter's once the agent's profits have been redefined in the marketing firm's model. 
The findings of this article are briefly summarized in section IV, the concluding 
remarks. Section 11 introduces the basic theoretical model of this article, and draws several 
implications, denoted as R1 to R5, on the decisions of the import diversification and hedging 
levels firom optimal conditions. Most of these observations are quite different firom those of 
Wolfs as well as other papers dealing with the case of non-diversification. The 
observations also indicate that a caution must be given in analyzing the interactive effects 
due to 'diversification and the use of currency futures markets' to a firm within the 
firamework of the optimal portfolio of decisions. The next section (III) shows some 
generalized findings of this article by comparing the total import level of the firm under 
several possibilities (section ni.l), and the effects of model parameters in imports and 
hedging ratio (section in.2). The underlying cause in section HI. 1 stems firom the 
observations of section II, which show the possible conflict between the diversification effect 
(i.e., a lower variance of return due to correlation in importing prices) and currency hedging 
effect. Lastly, section in.2 is an analysis of comparative statistics for only two exporters to 
examine sensitivities of these decisions with respect to changes in model parameters. Doing 
so, the purpose of the section is to visualize the impact of changes in the closeness of 
stochastic price movements on diversification incentive of an agent and on the optimal hedge 
ratio. 
n. DECISION MODEL 
Suppose a risk-averse processing firm that produces and sells a certain product in the 
domestic market and imports one of its major inputs fi^om abroad under price uncertainty. 
The firm's objective is to maximize its expected utility of profit denominated in domestic 
currency. Import prices are the only stochastic variables that the firm faces, but there are a 
couple of sources of imcertainty in each importing price, which is input price itself and the 
exchange rate. The dual sources are assumed to be independent with each other in a 
multiplicative form, following Wolf. If there exists a suppUers' monopolistic market power. 
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mainly due to product differentiation, then we may observe incomplete pass-through of 
exchange rates (Krugman) which obscures the independence assimiption. As long as the 
market power is minimal to the importer, however, factors affecting changes in exchange 
rates are presumably different from factors affecting changes in the input price. 
The firm has accesses to currency futures markets, but has no second hedging markets 
available for the commodity price to be imported. Instead, the firm has channels available 
for the import from several suppliers of that major or material input, in which inputs from 
these coimtries are assumed to be homogeneous. Diversification cost, such as agency cost, 
might not be totally neghgible in reality, but it would be an issue outside the scope of this 
paper. Currency futures markets exist for all of the exporters' cvurencies, so the basic model 
structure in this theoretical section deals with the opportunity set of involving both strategies 
in a full level. This multiple hedging assumption will be released in section III.l to deal with 
other possibilities for diversification. They include cases of using the single ciirrency (e.g., 
US$) for the input purchase, which is equivalent to the case of importing from supphers in a 
single coimtry. If only a single or a limited number of currency futures markets, then the 
cross-hedging can be also used to hedge against stochastic exchange rates of exporting prices, 
given transferability of some or even majority of systematic exchange rate risk among 
developed markets (Ziobrowski; 1995). 
Each import price is denominated in the home (import) country's currency and is 
assumed to be expressed as vvy = gjFj , for the country j for any j=l,..., n. gj indicates the 
realized input price and Pj is the real exchange rate between these two countries. Since this 
is a partial equilibrium model of a single importing commodity, the stochastic process of any 
exchange rate is assumed to be unrelated to that of any input price {gj), for j from one 
through n, as noted earlier. In other words, is expectation- and variance-independent of 
gj, for all i, j=l,..., n. This specification of prices visualizes each source of xmcertain price 
and makes it feasible to use currency futures markets to hedge against one of risky soiurces of 
these import prices. 
The firm makes purchasing decisions of that input based on an one-period planning 
horizon perspective, such as an annnal planning. Pturchases can be made via either spot 
markets or forward contracts that do not fix the price in advance, such as formula contracts. 
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depending on market characteristics. At the beginning of an one-period planning period, 
before the price is realized, demand and hedging decisions must be made simultaneously in 
order to acquire the uncertain terminal wealth at the end of the horizon, provided that the firm 
does not engage in the trade business of 'purchase and resale' of the products. The firm is a 
price taker in input markets in the probability sense. In other words, the firm is not large 
enough to affect its subjective probabihty distribution in those prices. Since the model is 
restricted only to the case of input uncertainty to focus on the diversification decisions as well 
as hedging effects, we are basically assuming that the firm has a prior knowledge on its 
output market structure, including technological relations and the degree of output market 
power, with certainty. 
The agent's attitude towards risk can be described by a twicely-differeciable Von 
Neumann-Morgenstem utihty function U(7c) where U'>0, U"<0. It is assimied that the 
a g e n t  o r  p r o d u c e r  h a s  a  n e g a t i v e  e x p o n e n t i a l  u t i l i t y  f i m c t i o n ,  e x p r e s s e d  a s  E U { 7 f ) = -
where A, is a Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion, defined as -U"/U'. This 
utihty fimction, as a resiilt, imposes the constant absolute risk aversion over all feasible range 
of wealth. Furthermore, the specification of mean-variance is used to investigate this 
optimahty analysis for risky pricing situations in the presence of the opportunity of import 
diversification. The mean-variance model, as is well known, is consistent with the model of 
expected utility, when utihty is qiudratic, wealth is normally distributed, and/or choices 
involve a single random variable or linear combinations of random variables (Meyer: 1987). 
Given these assmnptions, the terminal wealth, or the cash flow, at the end of each 
period, without time subscriptions, is expressed as 
(1) S = m ( X ; Z ) -  I W j X j  
=  N R ( X ; Z ) - Z g , f j X j  +  
MR is the short-run revenue of output sales net of production costs, and is the fimction of the 
total import level (X) given Z, where X is the total import levels, as the sxma of each import of 
homogeneous products. Z is a vector of non-risky and long-run inputs and xj is the import of 
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the stochastic input from the j-th country, for j=l, , n. It is also assumed that NR'>0, 
NR" <0 with respect to X, given a positive but declining marginal productivity. 
The corresponding revenue from manipulations in currency ftitures contracts will be 
where XfQ) and are the current and the end-of-period rate, 
respectively, for a unit currency futures contract and Cj is the quantity contracted. Since basis 
risk, which is the difference between fj- and r, is insignificant in financial fiitures, it is not 
considered in this p^er and is replaced by Pj (e.g., Eaker and Grant). Under the 
certainty of return, a diversification scheme is economically feasible only if outputs/inputs are 
non-homogeneous and their mixture yields a higher return or utility (assuming a homothetic 
function of return), based upon the production and demand structure of, for example, the case 
of economics of scope or the third price discrimination over distinguished markets. 
Under these set-ups, we obtain optimal input and hedging decisions by solving the 
following problem of maximizing the expected utility (V) of the firm, with respect to the 
mixture of suppliers and hedging levels, Xi's and Ci's for any i of one through n, where 
V = E (U(;r)) =1^ - A / 2 - var tt, 
w/s 
subject to the quantity constraints of (a) X=Zxi, and (b) Xi >0, for all i=l,..., n. The agent, 
or a marketing firm, who handles the whole process from production to sales of the output, 
should solve the corresponding first order conditions simultaneously to get the optimal 
choices, xi,..., Xn, and thus X, the total import level, as well as q's at a given decision time. 
Notations for the equations in this section are defined as follows: 
the notation denotes the agent's subjective expectation operator, 
X measures Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion, 
the notation is the transpose of a vector or a matrix, 
X* is nxl vector of optimal qiiantities of each supplier, 
MNR(X;Z) is nxl column vector of marginal net revenues, whose elements are the same for 
all Xi's since all imports are perceived to be homogeneous, 
w, or f' gy, is nxl colunm vector of expected importing prices, 
r and are nxl column vectors of the expected exchange rates and current futures rates 
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respectively, 
g; a n d f j  are nxn diagonal matrices of expected export prices and expected currency rates 
respectively, where non-diagonal elements of the matrices are zeros, 
m is nxl expected margin defined as MNR(X;Z) - W, 
Zww is nxn variance-covariance matrix of importing prices, and 
Sn- and Lgg are variance-covariance matrices of exchange rates and export(input) prices 
respectively. 
The variance of the end of period wealth can be expressed as 
(2) var;r = x'Z^x+c'S^c-2c'I^x 
= x'(g^I^g,+r^Sg^r,+S^Z^)x + c'Z^ -2c'I^g,x 
Note that Eww is factored into covariance matrices of r and g, the two stochastic components 
ofw, as gf "Err g/+ff'Zggff+'Zrr ^gg• Based on the work by Bohenstedt and Goldberger 
(1969), this derivation was possible due to the assimiption that any rj, the exchange rate 
component of the import price, is expectation- and variance- independent of any gj, the 
country j-specific input price of Wj. Furthermore, the assumption of multivariate normaUty 
of ri, Tj, and gic, for any i, j, or k for 1 through n will lead to the exact covariance matrix" of 
c'SwrXas c'Z„ g/X. 
Combining first order conditions associated with optimal input decisions and hedging 
decisions will result in the following optimality conditions, in vector-matrices forms, 
(3) MNR(^*;Z)'-W+(f-r^)'g,-A-[x'Z_-x'g,S^g,]=0', 
assimiing the non-negative constraints are satisfied. This implies that, if optimal Xi* for any 
i turns out to be negative in an empirical exercise, by the complementary slackness condition, 
the Xi* is zero as the shadow price of the constraint becomes a positive value. The term 
x'[Eww- g^ g/ ]x in equation (3) stands for the portfolio variance. Further, the second 
order conditions are easily met if the utility fimction is concave (Ingersoll) and if the MV-
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specification ensnres the concavity. Optimal currency hedging levels and quantities of 
imports can be expressed as 
(4) c*= =^[Z;'+(Z^Zg,+i=;Igyf,)-'gJ-(r-r^) 
+ yg/Err Sgy +f, r,]-' • m ( X * ; Z , w )  
(5) x*=^[S^Sgg+r,S^r;]-'-[m+g,-(r-r^)] . 
The close observations on these equations yield the following five results of R1 to R5 
of the effects on the mixture of input suppliers by the inclusion of futures markets as 
additional hedging tools, and also about the hedging levels: 
Rl. If input prices are perceived to be non-stochastic, the remaining uncertainty source 
which is the exchange rate risk can be completely hedged away by engaging in futures 
contracts. 
R2. Given the availability of diversification, 'non-separation' holds even under imbiased 
rates and without basis risk. 
R3. The optimal currency hedging removes total variability of the import prices that the 
firm faces by the amount of cov(r^ ,r-), for any k and i, in each element of the 
variance-covariance matrix of import prices. 
R4. Unlike the case of Wolf, the non-diversification scheme with a single currency futures 
market, an upward (downward) bias in a currency does not necessarily lead to a higher 
(lower) hedging level of that currency. 
R5. Despite the ambiguity on speculation levels, diversification strategy does not change 
the relationship of the minimum-variance hedge ratio, the long position, in each maricet 
as long as exchanges rates are independent of input prices. 
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For result 1, if input prices( g ) are fixed at the decision time, the term Zv™ will 
disappear in the portfolio variance in equation (3) via engaging in optimal currency hedging. 
From the optimal condition, in this case, the agent has no incentive to diversify away unless 
products are non-homogeneous. Since the exchange rate uncertainty is directly hedged 
through the currency futures, the optimal X* is equal to a certain Xj* that yields the highest 
return of MJ4R(xj*) - among the products available, regardless of the speculation level. 
However, as long as the input prices are perceived to be stochastic to the decision-maker, it is 
rational to involve in the diversification strategy in the real side, and most of the shares 
should not be zero in reality, unless some prices are significantly above the market price 
(Wolak and Kostad). 
The examination of non-separation between hedging and import or production 
decisions (result 2) ensures the validity of involving diversification; i.e., if the separation is 
feasible, the agent will choose the Xi in a way mentioned above. In his 1995 paper. Wolf 
shows that, in the presence of multiplicative forms of two or more variables, the separation 
property does not hold and these two decisions are not independent to each other. The 
implicit optimal solutions in equations (4) and (5) clearly display this result, even under the 
most simplified model assimiption of the unbiased futures rates without basis risk. This in 
turn impUes that the interactive effects due to diversification and the use of currency futures 
markets to a firm should be examined in caution within the fi-amework of the optimal 
portfolio decisions of a firm. 
Most importantly, result 3 exhibits the imderlying cause of changes in the mixture of 
suppliers (x) by engaging in futures contracts. This indicates the reduction of own-variance 
of prices by and the covariance term by g^g- cov{r^,r^) for any i^^k, but the direction 
of changes in the covariance terms is ambiguous if some ofif-diagonal elements of the matrix 
happen to be negative. This in turn draws an ambiguity in the changes in the portfolio 
variance, g/ ]x • The next subsection (III.l) focuses on the real effect of the 
total import level (X*), and the following R4 and R5 simmiarize the relevant issues in terms 
of optimal hedging levels or ratios. The right-hand-side of equation (4) is the sum of the 
speculative term and the minimum variance hedging level. The diversification effect is 
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directly reflected in the speculative part and indirectly reflected in the set of hedging levels 
(c*) through X*. 
m. HVTERPRETATIONS 
in.l. Diversification and Hedging Effects 
To examine the effects of diversification and introduction of currency futures markets 
on the level of total import or production, three propositions are shown in this subsection, 
and some comments about the implications on these findings are presented at the end of this 
subsection. 
Proposition 1. Let and X* be the total import level under diversification only and 
under the basic model of the previous section respectively. If all off-diagonal elements of 5^ 
are positive, then < X*, unless the firm faces an extreme contango in current futures 
rates. But the relationship does not necessarily hold if some^ exchange rates exhibit negative 
correlation, even under the unbiasness of currency futures. 
proof. Appendix 1.1 
Proposition 2. If all input purchases are made in a single currency (e.g., US S), then the 
total import level(say X®) is always higher than X^, unless the firm faces an extreme contango 
in futures rates. 
proof Appendix 1.2 
Proposition 3. Let the currency futures markets to be imbiased and X^ to be the total 
imports under a single (cross) currency hedging scheme with diversification. Under 
positive correlation of exchange rates with the currency used for the cross hedging, and of 
input prices, we have the following relationships that (a) X** < X^ < X*, and also (b) Xj* < Xj*^, 
where Xj*^ is the imports firom supplier i and its currency used for the cross hedging. 
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proof. Appendix 1.3 
Previous studies (e.g.. Broil: 1996; Wolf: 1995) draw a common implication that 
production of a competitive firm increases with an introduction of unbiased fiittires market(s) 
which directly eliminates the associated risk in the return to some degree. Propositions 1 
and 3, however, show that the statement is not necessarily guaranteed for a firm of our model, 
if some of the currencies are negatively correlated. That is because of the compensation of 
advantages of participating currency futures, which is the removal of the terms of exchange 
rate variance, g, g,, over the reduction of benefits firom the optimal (or Markowitz) 
portfolio (e.g., a lower variance of profit contributed by imperfect correlation in prices). 
The above in tum implies that the total import effect of introducing currency futures 
contracts depends on how the relevant exchange rates are correlated. In other words, if 
exchange rates are negatively (positively) correlated, then the introduction of currency futures 
contracts reduces (increases) the 'bowing' property or convexity to expected return axis of 
portfolio variance by removing the negative (positive) correlation terms. As a consequence, 
the effect of introducing currency futures is not as apparent as in the case of non-
diversification in increasing the total import, thus production, level. We should note that the 
degree of exchange rate correlation indicates the degree of transferability of the systematic 
risk among the relative currencies. Our findings thus imply the potential deviation in real 
effects among firms or industries, depending on the group of associated trading partners, via 
the introduction of currency futures; i.e., the total imports can be significantly increased 
(X*» X^) or be even smaller (X*< X^) in an extreme. 
In a rough manner, this can be illustrated graphically in the efficient firontier as shown 
in Graph 1 of Appendix 2. The utility level increases in any case by the inclusion of direct 
hedging tools, exchange rate futures, as the opportunity set increases or moves leftward. 
But, the firontier, denoted as F* in the graph, can be either less or more bowed than the 
firontier imder diversification alone (Fd). As a result of the 'less (more) convexity', we may 
end up with a lower (significantly higher) total import level. 
If only a single currency is what matters to the importer, then the introduction of 
currency futures market will result in a higher production level than X**, which is the import 
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(production) under the diversification scheme alone, according to Proposition 2. It is a 
realistic possibility in many commodities, considering the increased currency power of US 
dollars in the international trade. It also refers to the case of importing firom several 
suppliers firom a single country. We cannot generally draw the conclusion as to which total 
import level is greater between the cases of proposition 1 and 2 without more information. 
Proposition 3 further shows that the optimal total import level will be also increased 
than that under diversification strategy alone by making an appropriate cross hedging of a 
single or a limited nimiber of currency futures when its (iheir) currency rate(s) is positively 
related to other exporting countries'. Previous studies have introduced cross-hedging or 
imperfect hedging as means to reduce parts of the risk that firms face in absence of a direct 
hedging tool to reduce the source of risk (Eaker and Grant; Broil and Wahl on indirect 
hedging; and Bowden (1995) on a natural hedging). In these articles, the level of the 
corresponding trade decisions are determined to be somewhere between the levels under non-
use of hedging and under direct hedging given a non-extreme speculation value. This is 
also true in this paper imder the above restriction of exchange rate structure. The resulting 
import level of Proposition 3 is less than X*, which is from the basic model of using both 
strategies due to its largest opportunity set. 
But another finding of this study is that the import from the supplier i is greater than 
that under X* case, if currency i is used for the single cross hedging. Ex ante utility is of 
course higher under multiple-portfolio hedging, but a cross hedging using single or a limited 
number of currencies could be more beneficial to the financial manager of the importing firm 
in special cases. It is more simple to use under complicated restrictions, for instance, if a 
greater amoimt of total imports from a specific supplier is implicitly preferred over the total 
quantity, or if the manager is subject to various trading restrictions such as short-selling 
constraints of fixtures trading or less-than unitary ratio of hedging contracts (Glen and Jorion: 
1993). It can also be more economical in terms of low transaction costs, or if the estimates 
of the expectation on the import price are not quite dependable, given the transferability of a 
major portion of systematic exchange rate risk among developed countries (Zirobrowski: 
1995). 
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in.2. Comparative Statistics 
Finding out generalized parameter effects on the decision variables may be 
impossible within the portfolio framework without a prior knowledge on the realized 
variables. To get an insightful idea in a simple way, however, a comparative statistics 
analysis is performed for the case of only two exporting countries, as shown in Table 1, with 
positively correlated input prices (agdj)) for some cases, which is a reasonable assumption 
for any commodity. Also, unbiased futures prices are postulated throughout the comparative 
statistics analysis to concentrate on diversification and production decisions under non-
extreme values of exchange rates. In this model, if the marginal net revenue is constant over 
all ranges of total input demanded (X), then X* will increase considerably since the 
diversification provides not only a reduction in the volatility of return but also an increase 
in the expected return over a certain range'* of x vector. The plausible and realistic economic 
assxunption, however, will be a diminishing marginal net revenue, as we assumed, mainly due 
to a diminishing retum to scale of production. Unlike the case of constant MNR, optimal 
shares will not be independent of the total import level X* since the expected marginal retum 
in equation (5) varies with the level of X* chosen. 
As expected, an increase in the i-th expected import price (via either r-org^) or decrease 
in the expected margin results in a decrease in their own import levels (x;). However, there 
is a positive effect in cross imports (xj, for j^^i), given the perfect substitutability of products. 
The individual real effects are also clear with respect to changes in ando^^,-,; i.e., 
increases in variabihty of import prices will certainly cause a lower own import (Xj*) and a 
higher cross import (xj*). On the other hand, the total production effect (X*) as a sum of xi * 
and X2* is in general ambiguous. For instance, X* due to changes will decrease if 
<yr(i2) > 0> and the values of model parameters are in a reasonable range; i.e., 14^ii| > |4'jj| for i^tj 
and i, j=l, 2. ^ij is the partial derivative of the first-order-condition of Xi with respect to Xj, 
and the second-order conditions require a negative Tii for i, j=l, 2, and ^'11^22 - ^21^12 >0. 
If however (Tr(i2) is negative, the direction of changes in X* becomes ambiguous, as 
sign(<arY^„„)=sigil((4'^ 
This ambiguity in the total effect is due to the role of diversification in reducing the 
total variance (var(7r)) of profit. For a negative ar(i2), the diversification effect is relatively 
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Table 1. Comparative statistics of import decisions' • ^ 
Variable \ parameter ^0) 
Import from supplier 1 (Xi) - + 4- 7 - - h  7 
Import from supplier 2 (X2) + - + - 7 + - 0 
Total imports^ (X) 
- - a a a b b c 
1. Under the assumption of unbiased futures price in exchange rate, the sign of changes in hedging levels 
(q's), for i=l,n, is simply determined by the sign (dXi / dp) where p is any model parameter. 
2. For a, b, c, the results are ambiguous generally because of the trade ofif between expected income effect in 
(higher) Eti and diversification in (lower) var(7t). 
3. a: If CTr(ij) > 0, and |^ ii| > |^ ij| for i?"^' and i, j=l, 2, then X* decreases, otherwise ambiguous. 
b: Asct^,) increases, X* decreases if |4^ii| > |^ ij| for i=l, 2 where i^sj. 
c: X* decreases if cyr(ij) > 0, and |Tii| > |4'ij| for and i, j=l, 2. 
If ar(ij) < 0, and |*Fii| > [M'ijl for and i, j=I, 2, then X* decreases as |CTr(i2)| increases. 
large, and thus an increase ino^(,) may result in a lower var(7t) and a higher total import level 
at the expense of a lower expected margin. If the covariance (CTg(i2), ctj^u)) are positive, then 
the changes in Xi's with respect to becomes less sensitive to the diversification effect. 
This generally induces a higher var(7c) than the case of negative covariance, and the increased 
uncertainty induces a lower total production. Similar results of own and cross effects apply 
to the case of an increase incf;(j), i=l, 2, such as, assxmiing a positive (Jg(i2), the negative 
effect on own imports, but positive effect in cross imports. The total effect in this case is 
still ambiguous, but is likely to be negative if |^ii| > |4^iji regardless of the sign of ar(i2), 
given the reduced structure of var(7r) through the currency hedging. 
In terms of an increase in covariance terms (CTg(i2), cTr^n)), the intuition is clear despite 
ambiguity in signs of changes in Xi* and X2*, as the closer the stochastic movement in 
import prices, the less incentive the firm to diversify importing channels and thus a lower 
total import. In the reasonable range of parameter values (i.e., |^ii| > for i^g and 
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ij=l,2), if both(CTr(i2) and <Tg(i2)) are positive values, then the total import X* Avill decrease, as 
the benefit of the diversification decreases due to an increase in the total var(7c). The sign of 
5X*/5ag(i2) becomes ambiguous, but the change is less sensitive than the case of positive 
ar(i2) under the same condition. Also, 5X*/5|cTr(i2)| is strictly positive for the absolute value 
of CTr(i2) when (Ti(12) is negative in the given condition. Total imports of the input will again 
decrease in general as import prices become more positively correlated with each other. 
Unbiased fixtures rates are one of the underlying assumptions of this comparative 
statistics, and thus the analysis is limited to the minimum-variance hedge ratio as mentioned 
in the notel below the table. One meaningfiil examination under biased fiitures markets 
would be the changes in optimal hedge ratio with respect to the increase in price correlation, 
possibly due to an increase in tacit collusion or informational efiBciency. Assuming that the 
sign of is negative at the optimum; i.e., the individual import level decreases as 
import prices become more correlated, the optimal hedge ratio in each currency fiitures 
market will diverge fi-om the minimum-variance hedge ratio, as input prices become more 
positively correlated (+CTg(i2)). The divergence occurs regardless of the direction of 
subjective expectations in speculative terms. No such divergence would occur, of course, 
if the firm's expectation is unbiased. For a country i=l, 2, the change in hedge ratio with 
respect to changes in crg(i2) can be directly obtained from equation (4), as 
(6) . 
If a under hedge (i.e., a short fiitures position or a partial long hedge) is optimal (i.e., 
-c, >0), then the hedge ratio in the market i will decrease as the correlation in input 
prices increases, as can be seen from the equation. If on the other hand an over hedge (long 
speculation) turns out to be optimal in market i, the hedge ratio will increase with an increase 
in the correlation. This case is illustrated in Graph 2 of Appendix 2. 
The economic reasoning for these changes in hedge ratios is as follows. Since a 
decrease in Xj for all i is due to the decrease in benefits of diversification effect (a lower 
systematic risk of returns), the expected return efifect become relatively more significant to 
the firm as the positive ag(i2) increases. This increased sensitivity to the expected return 
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induces a higher weight on the speculation revenue from the manipulation of futures 
contracts. Such a result of divergence, however, is a limited case because of an ambiguity 
in changes in individual imports as cyg(i2) changes. The change in hedge ratio in each market 
i become rather ambiguous in general, especially if the correlation in exchange rates is 
negative, or the value of cyr(i2) varies with ag(i2). In sum, the bottom line in the analysis of 
currency hedging, under the biased futures market structure, is the divergence of hedge ratio 
in a market i from the minimum-variance hedge ratio (Ci/xj = E(g,)) if x; decreases as a result 
of an increase in the closeness of stochastic movements in input prices, in which the firm 
rehes on diversification as a means to reduce the risk. 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Firms involved in international trade are subject to fluctuations in exchange rates as 
well as price uncertainty itself. This study, under import price uncertainty, extends the 
analysis of previous hedging literature by including another feasible scheme, the 
diversification of importing channels of homogeneous products to multiple suppliers. The 
dual sources of uncertainties, input price itself and exchange rate, in import prices take 
multiplicative fonn and the firm is able to use currency futures contracts for all relevant 
currencies in our basic model. Close observations on the optimal conditions give us several 
results on the use of currency hedging in diversified strategies. The results related to real 
decisions (Rl, R2, R3) provide the justification for the use of both strategies given their 
different roles in portfolio risk reduction. The hedging decisions (R4, R5) on the other hand 
are related to the real portfolio in the speculation, but not in the pure hedging, part. 
In section HI. 1, it is shown that the effect of introducing imbiased currency futures 
markets to all relevant exporters' exchange rates (or to a limited number of currencies for a 
cross-hedging) depends on the degree that the relevant exchange rates are correlated. If 
they are all positively correlated (or if exchange rates are positively correlated with the 
currencies used for the case of cross hedging), then the resulting total import will be 
significantly increased. Otherwise, the changes in imports and thus production will become 
less significant, and may be even decreased in an extreme. Due to changes in the 
'covariance effect' of portfoUo variance, the implication is that there is an apparent positive 
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effect on real decision in the introduction of currency hedging tools for a firm or an industry 
involving trade with developed economic communities, such as in Western countries, where 
exchange rates are co-integrated in a high degree. The real effects, however, becomes less 
apparent for the industry when it involves trade with less developed financial markets, whose 
currency fluctuations are less affected by the market-wide systematic risk. 
This article investigates mainly the effects of introducing ciurency hedging to a firm 
which diversifies imports of its material (or major) inputs into multiple suppliers under the 
import price uncertainty. The market power of suppliers is not considered, and this article 
deals only with the competitive and risk-averse importing agent. If market power is present 
because of a collusive behavior of suppliers, then we expect increased input prices, and thus 
lower total imports. We also expect an increased closeness of the stochastic movements in 
input prices, since the sources of fluctuations are likely to be economic-wide shocks under 
collusion. Thus, the findings of this paper indicates that (a) the benefits of risk reduction 
due to diversification will be reduced, (b) the role of currency hedging will become in 
general more significant in risk reduction, and (c) the optimal hedge ratio on currency fixtures 
markets tends to diverge fi-om the minimum-variance hedge ratio under biased rates. On the 
other hand, if the existence of suppliers' power in an import market is due to heterogeneity of 
inputs, then the degree of exchange rate pass-through matters in the analysis; i.e., exchange 
rates and input prices are not independent with each other. In this incidence, we expect a 
less closeness of import price fluctuations and, roughly, the reversed results of the above 
case. The results, however, also depend on many other industry- or firm-specific factors 
such as output market structure of an importing firm. 
REFERENCES 
Basak, Suleyman, 1996, An Intertemporal Model of International Capital Market 
Segmentation, Jr. Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31:2: 161-187. 
Blair, Roger D., 1974, Random Input Prices and the Theory of the Firm, Economic 
Inquiry, 214-225. 
Bohenstedt, G. W., and Goldberger, A. S., 1969, On the Exact Covariance of Products of 
Random Variables, Jr. American Statistical Association, 64: 1439-1442. 
22 
Bowen, Roger J., 1995, Production Organization and Risk Control When Market 
Instruments Are Available, Management Science, 41: 6: 1073-1082. 
Broil, Udo and Wahl, Jack E., 1996, Imperfect Hedging and Export Production, Southem 
Economic Journal, 62: 667-674. 
Broil, Udo, Wahl, Jack E., and Zilcha, Itzhak, 1995, Indirect Hedging of Exchange Rate 
Risk, Jr. Intemational Money and Finance, Oct.: 667-678. 
Donoso, Guillermo, 1995, Exporting and Hedging Decisions With a Forward Currency 
Market: The Mxilti-period Case, Jr. Futures Markets, 15: 1: 1-11. 
Dombusch, R., 1987, Exchange Rates and Prices, American Economic Review, 77: 93-106 
Eaker, Mark R., and Grant, Dwigt M., 1987, Cross-Hedging Foreign Currency Risk, 
Jr. Intemational Money and Finance, March: 85-105. 
Glen, Jack and Jorion, Philippe, 1993, Currency Hedging for Intemational Portfolios, 
Jr. Finance, Dec.: 1865-1886. 
IngersoU, Jonathan E., 1987, Theory of Financial Decision Making, Rowman and 
Littlefield Inc., Savage, MD. 
Kawai, Masachiro and Zilcha, Itzhak, 1986, Intemational Trade with Forward-Futures 
Markets Under Exchange Rate and Price Uncertainty, Jr. Intemational Economics, 
Feb.: 83-98. 
Kerkvliet, Joe and Moffett, Michael H., 1991, The Hedging of an Uncertain Future Foreign 
Cuacrency Cash Flow, Jr. Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 26: 4: 565-578. 
Kmgman, Paul, 1986, Pricing to Market When Exchange Rate Changes, in S. W. Amdt and 
J. D. Richardson (eds.), Real-Financial Linkages Among Open Economics, 1987, The 
MTT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Meyer, J., 1987, Two-Moment Decision Models and Expected Utility Maximization," 
American Economic Review, 77: 421-430. 
Paroush, J. and Wolf, Avner, 1992, The Derived Demand with Hedging Cost Uncertainty 
in Futures Markets, The Economic Joumal, 102: 831-844. 
Scherer, F. M. and Ross, David, 1991, Industrial Market Stmcture and Economic 
Performance, 3rd ed., Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, MA. 
23 
Sheldon, Ian, 1995, Contracting, Imperfect Information and the Food System, Paper 
presented at conference on "PubUc Policy in Foreign and Domestic Market 
Development," organized by the Food and Agricultural Mariceting Consortium, 
Jan.12-13, Orlando, FL. 
Wolak, F. A. and Kolstad C. D., 1991, A Model of Homogeneous Input Demand Under 
Price Uncertainty, American Economic Review, 81: 3: 514-38. 
Wolf, Avner, 1995, Import and Hedging Uncertainty in International Trade, Jr. Futures 
Markets, 15:2: 101-110. 
Zilcha, Itzhak and Broil, Udo, 1992, Optimal Hedge by Firms with Multiple Sources of 
Risky Revenues, Economics Letters, Aug.; 473-77. 
Ziobrowski, B. J. and Ziobrowski Alan, 1995, Exchange Rate Risk and Intemationally 
Diversified Portfohos, Jr. International Money and Finance, 14: 1: 65-81. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. For the paper dealing with output price uncertainty, with known input prices and 
production process, the imphcit justification for (only) output price uncertainty is on the 
existence of time-lag between production decision and actual production and sales of output. 
On the other hand, for a rationale of the case of stochastic input price, one might first 
imagine a firm taking orders for future delivery of its product at a fixed price. Once 
committed to producing the specific output quantities, actual input prices, especially material 
input costs, are not known in advance xmtil the inputs are purchased. Most competitive 
bidding contracts generally fall into this class of problem (Blair: 1974). 
Another case is that, in developing contracts, importers/exporters want to stabilize the 
import quantity levels, but one of them or both parties have no incentive to lock in the price. 
Formula contracts, or any quantity-fixing forward contracts, for instance, in crude oil trade or 
food processing industries, are examples for this case, which allows a room for different 
price expectations. The problem of imperfect information, due to the moral hazard and the 
adverse selection the principle faces, provides the reasoning for this type of contracts. For 
instance, Sheldon(1995)'s paper examines that, while contracts between faraiers and food 
processors can offer agents some degree of insurance from risk, fiiU insurance cannot be 
offered because of the need to provide incentive at the margin for agents to exert efforts. 
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2. To show derivations of the first and the third terms of the right-hand-side of 
equation (2), 
a) let X, y, and z be jointly distributed random variables and Ai = i - Ei for i = x,y,z. 
In terms of the nxn covariance matrix Swr, cov(xy, z) = Ex cov(y, z) + Ey cov(x, z) + 
E(Ax)(Ay)(Az), which implies that, for any i and j, cov(Wj,rj) = cov(giri, rj) = EgiCov(rj,rj) + 
EriCOv(gi,rj) + E(Agi Arj ATJ). Cov(gj,rj) is equal to zero by the model assumption and, if g; 
,ri, and rj for any i j, are distributed as the multivariate noraial, the third expectation term 
vanishes mto zero. This result can be summarized in the form of matrix as 2wr= 2^E(gi). 
b) Zww can be factored into covariance matrices of r and g, based on the same 
assumptions. For any cov(wi,Wj) = cov(g,ri, gfj), each temi is approximated as EgiCov(rj,w,) 
+ EriCOv(gi,Wj) + E(Agi Agj)(Ari Arj). Cov(ri,Wj) is reduced into the expression of 
EgjCov(ri,rj), and also cov(gj,Wj) into ErjCov(gi,gj). E(Agi Agj)(Arj ATJ) is equal to cov(gj, 
gj)cov(ri, rj) + cov((Agj Ag,), (Ari Arj)) by the definition of a covariance, and, since the 
stochastic movement of any r is assumed to be independent of any g in this paper, the last 
term, cov((Agi Agj), (Ari Arj)), turns out to be zero, and thus we draw the above result in 
matrices. Or, note that exact covariance matrices of Sww can be easily derived by the 
formula that, if x is expectation- and variance-independent of y, then var(xy) = (Ex)^vary + 
(Ey)^varx + varx vary. Applying the same step to the matrix operations, since ri is 
independent of gi, the same equation can be readily obtained (See Bohenstedt and 
Goldberger for a detail). 
3. The word 'some' is mathematically unclear unless the functional form of NR(X) and 
specific parameter values are known. However, the logic behind the term refers to the level 
that affects the expected utility of agent significantly due to loss in diversification benefits 
versus gain firom manipulations in futures markets. 
4. Without the consideration of futures markets, the range indicates that optimal 
solutions satisfy the following. Given a non-negative expected retum fix)m using only the 
least expected inexpensive imports, we obtain the following relationship as 
{X"" — A!"")=(w'-x* -WjA'") / MNR, where X** and X" denote the optimal total imports from 
diversification and non-diversification cases, respectively, as defined before, and is the 
lowest expected import price among n prices. 
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APPENDICES 
1. Proofs of Propositions 
1. proof of Proposition 1 
(a) Let Cia be the k-th row and i-th column element of the reduced form of variance-
covariance matrix of the random profit in equation (5). Note that the initial variance is 
reduced by g, li after being adjusted by optimal hedging positions in equation (4) for all 
relevant currency fixtures markets. The first order condition for an input Xj, after adjusted 
with optimal fixtures positions, is 
(7) m-XX*) + ) = /I • X 
:=1 
- <^riks)SkSi)x\ 
* i 
= /l-
The expected margin (^) is a fimction of the total import level X*. If exchange rates, as 
well as input prices, are positively correlated, then any cid is less than its corresponding 
e l e m e n t  o f  t h e  m a t r i x  w i t h o u t  t h e  h e d g i n g  t o o l  b y  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  •  c o v ( r j .  
For a positively biased or imbiased fixtures rate, let's assixme X*' = X*. Then, 
compared with the case without currency fixtures, the left-hand-side of equation (7) is higher 
(if backwardation) or the same (if unbiased), but the right-hand-side becomes lower due to a 
lower value of each Cid, uixless Zxk* in eqixation (7) increases enough to compensate the 
decrease in variance terms. This however contradicts the assumption of X^ = X*. The 
similar analogy applies to the case if X^ > X*, which also leads to the contradiction. 
Therefore X* should be greater than X^, under a declining fixnction of and positively 
correlated exchange rates, unless the firm faces highly downward biased fixtures structure. 
On the other hand, if some of exchange rates in terms of the importing country's 
currency and/or input prices are negatively correlated, then we carmot draw any general 
result on the direction of changes of the right-hand-side of equation (7). This is becaixse of 
an ambiguity of changes in (CTw(ic,i) -ftfj • cov(r4,/;.)) for all k, i, and thus Z(ciri Xk*), 
compared with that under the following eqixation (7'). The equation is the optimal condition 
for the diversification strategy alone with respect to Xj: 
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(7') = 
Therefore the change in X* is also unclear, even under unbiased futures. That is basically 
because of the conflict between the diversification effect (the reduction in total variance of 
wealth significantly contributed by negatively correlated sources of import prices) and the 
currency hedging effect (a reduction of total variance by the amount of g, gi given non­
existence of basis risk). The optimal position thus will be determined based on specific 
values of model parameters on the current information set, such as time series components of 
prices, and the output market structure of production relationships and the firm's 
monopolistic market power in the industry. The following shows an example for a higher 
than the level of X*. 
(b) Consider only 2 suppliers as an illustrative example. First, if the firm uses both 
strategies, then, from the conditions of optimal imports in eqxiation (5), we can derive the 
following by subtracting the optimal conditions for X2 from the condition for xi, 
"7(^2 ~ ) "•'^1 (*^I) — ~ -^2 (<^^2) ~ *^*(1.2)) (7.1) A. 
-^r iX2)Sxgz)  +  
=x\a - x\b - x^c + xld . 
Secondly, if the firm only involves in the diversification strategy, then, 
(7.2) ^(w,-W^)=xfa-x^b , 
where = o7(i)S^i ^w(U)~^r(u)S^i^2 
similarly for Cw(2)^- The equations can be rearranged as respectively 
(7.3) x'a = (W2 — vv,)+xj(6-cf)+x'^c , and 
(7.4) xfa  =  (wj-w^)-¥x tb  
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Assume that Xi* and are the same and also Xi*= X2*. Then, (b+c-d) x2* should equal to 
hxi to hold the equality between the right-hand-side of equations (7.3) and (7.4), which 
indicates that we may have X2'' > X2*, and thus >X*, if c>d. To have this condition, 
Od, we must observe the negative correlation in exchange rates (and possibly between input 
prices), and ff >g;. Also, it should be noted that taking the similar analogy for the 
positive correlation is not valid since it violates the first-order conditions, as shown in the 
proof early. // 
2. proof of Proposition 2 
In this case, the first-order condition for x after adjusting with optimal futures positions 
can be written as 
{3') m(X»;Z,w)+(r-r/)r-g,-Af.[l^-<r,%'.g,] = 0' , 
where i is the nxl vector of 1 's, and = o;g/g, +(r* + a;) Zgy• Since all elements of 
Iww are positive values, all elements in the variance term of the blank [ ] in equation (3') are 
smaller than the corresponding element of Sww. Unless (f-r^) is extremely negative 
value, X® is always greater than X^ (This can be easily seen by applying the same logic of 
equation (7) in the proof of Proposition 1. // 
3. proof of Proposition 
Since the main logic behind a cross hedging or any imperfect hedging is transferability of 
the systematic exchange rate risk among exporting countries (Broil et al.: 1995), we'll 
postulate the use of a single currency fixtures (say, country 1) for the purpose of cross 
hedging of multiple exchange rate risk. The stochastic return to the firm at the end of a 
period is 
7r= NR{X) - w' -x + (r, - ) • c,, and the variance of the return is 
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var K= x ' I .^x+ • cf  -  2c, x , 
where Siw (Sir) is the nxl covariance column vector between import prices (exchange rates) 
and country I's currency rate, and g,*<7r(i)^ and F,F*<^r(i.k) are the first and the k-th element of 
2iw 
After solving for the first order conditions under the assumption of unbiased futures 
price, the component of g, g, in the variance of profit in equation (2) is reduced by 
EiwSiw'/Ord)^, and thus g, g, becomes 
(8.1) g, •(Z^-(Z„Z,//o-;(,)))-g, 
=gi • 
0 0 ... 0 
® ^r(2) -(<^rO .2) /^r(l) )—<^r(2.3) (^r(l.2)^r(l.3) /^r(\) ) 
^  ^r(2 .3)  ( . ^r ( \ .2)^rUJ) /^r( l ) )—'^r in)  r( \ .n)  /  ^  m))  
SI 
This yields the following relationship for any i, at the optimum, as 
(8.2) m,(X' )=A-
k=2 
where Cii is the i-th row and the 1-st column element, or its symmetric element, of the 
reduced variance in equation (5), as defined in Proposition 1. Also, djk is the corresponding 
element of Sw -2iw2iw'/cjr(i)^, the reduced form of the total variance under the single cross 
hedging, where specific values for the reduction are expressed in equation (8.1). Given a 
positive ag(i,k) for all i, k, which is a reasonable assumption in reality, if all exchange rates are 
positively correlated with the currency 1, then is greater than X^. That's because of 
lower values of each qi and djk, than the corresponding term under diversification only, 
following the method in the proof of Proposition 1. The similar analogy can be appUed to 
the relationship of X*, since, for each djk, dik < Cik- If some exchange rates are 
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negatively correlated to the currency 1, then the relationship between dik and Cik for all i and k 
(i^ik: off-diagonal elements) is not clear, and thus the value of IX* - 1 is ambiguous as 
mentioned in the proof of Proposition 1. 
To show xi* < Xi*^, first note that ^(^*)<^(A"^)for any i at the equilibrium, given a 
declining function of the expected margin and the relationship of X^< X*. If xj * = xi*^, then, 
n n  
compared with equations (7) and (8.2), Xi'^Cii= Xi*Cii, and must be greater than 
enough to compensate the reduction in dik, for all k(>l) and i, and the higher value of 
^ ( X") in equation (8.2). This contradicts the first result ofX^<X*. Ifxi*>xi'^, then 
R 
Xi'^qi< xi*Cji, and Z xl must be even greater than the case of X*^< X* enough to 
compensate the value of (xi* - xi*^). This increase in xl can be seen more clearly if we 
consider equation (8.2) with respect to xi, since Ci i>cik for any k(>l). Therefore, Xj* < xi*^ 
to have a proper balance. // 
2. Graphs 
1. In the graph, Ud refers to the indifference curve of the importer under diversification 
scheme alone, U* is the curve under both schemes, and FD and F* correspond to the EV 
fi-ontiers respectively in each regime. As for engaging in currency futures, the efficient 
frontier will shift leftward from that under diversification alone (Fd) to F*, which is either less 
or more convex to ETII p-axis of portfolio. Thus, the improvements in the expected utility 
level from'd' to might be either small or significantly large. 
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U* 
U*Ud 
Fd 
VarTcl p 
Graph 1. EV frontier 
2. Assuming a constant 5xi/5CTg(i2), for each i=l,2, optimal hedge ratio(s) will diverge 
from the imbiased, or pure, hedge ratio, as shown below. Even if we have a non-constant 
5^Xi/5ag(i^)^, the deviation will be achieved as cjgd^) increases. 
Ci/Xi 
over hedge 
t if Xi* (i) 
unbiased 
under hedge >1 if Xj* (4-) 
Graph 2. Hedge ratio(s) under biased futures. 
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CHAPTER 2. DEMAND DIVERSIFICATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
AND MARKET POWER: APPLICATION TO 
THE CHINESE WHEAT IMPORT MARKET 
A paper prepared to be submitted to the Joumal of Business and Economics 
Jeong-Yun Seo 
ABSTRACT 
This paper justifies theoretically and empirically the diversification behavior of an 
importing firm when it chooses the mixture of potentially differentiated products of its major 
input under the price uncertainty. The paper investigates an equilibrium relationship 
among three key explanatory variables, which are the expected price, the systematic risk of 
price, and monopolistic market power of the suppliers in the market. The theoretical section 
shows that there exists a conflict between the risk-diversification effect and the agent's 
preference over certain products when the importer chooses the vector of optimal quantity 
shares. The later effect may disturb or even dominate the former, which can be represented 
in an equilibrium relationship similar to the framework of the CAPM. As an empirical 
application, the Chinese wheat import market is examined and analyzed to answer the 
questions raised from the basic statistics. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are many instances in which firms purchase a group of products from various 
sellers who charge different prices. In the intemational trade, for instance, some suppliers 
may have consistently higher prices than their competitors' during considerable time periods, 
yet still supply significant portions of total imports. This situation seems to violate the 
criterion of expected cost minimization for input choice. Wolak and Kostad (WK), in their 
1991 AER paper on input demand diversification, show one way to choose the mixture of 
risky input suppliers, and how to quantify the relative risk characteristics of input prices in a 
fiiamework similar to that used to assess the relative risk of securities in the capital-asset-
pricing model (CAPM). Based on their work, this paper is designed to justify the 
diversification behavior of a buyer, an importing firm or a trader, of heterogeneous products 
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under price uncertainty by examining the relationships among the expected price, the 
systematic risk of price, and also the monopolistic market power of the suppUers in the 
market. 
The CAPM asserts that securities will be priced in equilibrium to yield an expected 
return that is a linear function of the systematic or non-diversifiable risk. In order to apply 
the same idea to real market analysis under price uncertainty, prior knowledge of the vector 
of optimal shares is required so that one can build the value of the market portfolio. The 
decision on quantity shares comes from the micro-economic framework of solving the 
importer's optimization problem under uncertainty. To find the mixture of optimal shares 
depending only on the time-series components of each import price, WK show that the 
optimization problem can be decomposed into a two-stage process, like the cost-
minimization problem. In the first stage, an optimal portfolio of suppUers is chosen to yield 
a given total amount of imports in each period time. To justify the portfolio of suppliers in 
an effort of risk management, they empirically examine the negative and linear relationship 
between the expected price and the measure of risk in Japanese steam coal imports market. 
Optimization by focusing only on the first step is known to be consistent with the 
expected utility maximization problem under price uncertainty and a non-stochastic 
production fimction (Pope and Chavas). The monetary value of the composition of these 
optimal shares determines the value of a market portfolio as a benchmark with which 
compares the market value of each supplying price in terms of its systematic price risk. The 
advantage of adopting systematic price risk, instead of conditional risk, is apparent in the 
sense that the measure reflects the agent's efforts to diversify away the uncertainty he faces, 
conditional on the total import or production level, and thus informs us of the hedging role of 
products imported. Despite their robust modification of the financial asset equilibrium idea 
in studying real asset allocation such as an import portfoUo, the paper by WK is limited to the 
assumption of 'homogeneous' products imported. In other words, their model attempts to 
justify the importer's incentive to diversify away the associated price risk purely within the 
context of a price-based portfolio. 
In reality, products imported are only homogeneous in a very limited way. WK's 
model concerns the buyer's problem of 'input cost' minimization imder price uncertainty in 
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deriving the optimal portfolio, and will not be consistent with the pricing behavior, if 
products appear to be distinguished by their product varieties. The existence of horizontal 
differentiation depends on a diversity of preferences or end-of-user purposes and is exploited 
within the economic context of imperfect substitution/ monopoUstic competition (Scherer: 
1990). A negative relationship, similar to CAPM, will not strictly hold under market 
imperfections. For instance, products of imperfect substitutes may lead the importer to 
consider the market power associated with certain varieties of products over their price or 
price risk, or if there is any collusive behavior among suppliers. Under non-homogeneity, 
increased import shares of certain products may even increase the profit of the importer over 
the increased input, or import, cost. 
To allow for heterogeneity of imports, we first need to redefine the value of the optimal 
portfolio, and thus the measure of risk, by taking into account supplier-specific influences on 
the observed equilibrium price. Given the lack of a well-defined model of the determinants 
of the relative risk measure adopted in WK's study, it is difficult to determine how much of 
the import price variation is explained by the risk measure and how much is attributable to 
the existence of monopolistic market power by the suppliers in the import diversification 
analysis. A number of papers have investigated the relationship between a firm's market 
power and the systematic, or non-diversifiable, risk of the firm's rate of retum on securities 
as explained by the Sarpe-Lintner CAPM (Subrahmanyam et al.: 1980; Chen et al.: 1986; 
Peyser: 1994; and Sun: 1993). These papers appear to have exclusively focused on the 
effects of a monopoly's market power, its capital-labor ratio, and the wage rate (Sim), on its 
own systematic risk. They find a negative relation between the market power and risk, using 
various definitions of the market power, for instance, the market value to book ratio, Tobin's 
q, or Coumot duopoly power, etc. 
The objective of this study is to examine, theoretically and empirically, the relationship 
of the degree of monopolistic power of the seller and the measure of relative price risk. This 
will provide an additional explanation of the observed prices and the choice-vector of import 
demands by the buyer, besides the time-series components of stochastic prices. The 
theoretical firamework overall follows that of Chen et al. However, because this paper deals 
with the import diversification instead of the rate of retum in secimty markets, the market 
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specific price risk (P;*) relative to the optimal import value (W*) will be the appropriate 
measure of relative risk instead the systematic risk (PJ in the CAPM. 
Section n first briefly explains the structure of WK's model to yield a negative and 
linear relationship between the expected price and its relative risk over all suppliers, given 
the homogeneity of products. A direct theoretical linkage is drawn between the 
monopolistic power of the supplier and the measure of relative risk, where both are driven 
from the equilibrium concept and from both buyer's and suppliers' optimality conditions. 
Implications drawn in Section n, when the assumption of homogeneity is relaxed, are as 
follows: 
1. The monopolistic market power of a supplier positively affects the relative risk of the 
price, and thus adversely affects the negative relationship shown by WK. 
2. The systematic price risk(Pi*) relative to the optimal market portfolio can be orthogonally 
decomposed into the net risk measure and a residual term due to the market power 
(Equation 10). 
3. A positive relationship between relative risk and the covariance between the expected 
price and the rate of return on the market portfolio is obtained. 
The main clarification of WK's work is on the possible conflicts between two effects. 
In other words, if monopolistic market power of suppliers is present, then this power will 
increase the expected dollar price of risk (Section n.2.2), and thus positively affect 
This is basically because the importer does not choose the vector of quantity shares based on 
the criterion of the cost-minimization under uncertainty given the heterogeneous returns on 
the revenue by products purchased. Thus, the existence of market power in excess of zero 
may disturb or even dominate the negative and linear relationship between expected price and 
Pi*. The later effect is only one considered by WK as a result of the risk-diversification 
effort of the buyer. The degree of significance of this power in a demand analysis is an 
empirical issue, but the theoretical section of this paper shows one way to extend the 
fi*amework of WK, based on their concept of the relative risk measure (P*). Section EI 
examines the Chinese wheat import market as an empirical application. 
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n. THEOREICAL MODEL 
n.l. Expected Price vs. Risk 
This subsection briefly explains the structure of WK's model, which demonstrates one 
method of constructing the concept of systematic risk relative to the value of the optimal 
market portfolio in a real asset allocation model (e.g., import diversification) similar to the 
CAPM. This concept of risk will be used as an analytic tool in section n.2. Time 
subscripts are not marked throughout the section for a notational simplicity. Since the 
market portfolio is imobservable (and a proxy, such as S&P500 in security markets, is also 
unavailable), WK build the value of the optimal market portfolio in an import market within 
the context of a 'price-based' portfolio from the perspective of the importer. For this 
purpose, consider a firm whose expected utility is defined as U(E, V) with U, >0 and U, <0, 
and E and V are the expected profit and variance of the profit, respectively. The firm 
purchases a set of homogeneous products from the several suppliers of total amount for the 
purpose of trading or production of outputs. 
The purchase prices (w, ) available from all n suppliers, which are the only stochastic 
variable to the buyer of products, are unknown at the time the quantities or quantity shares of 
products are chosen. The uncertainty is resolved at the end of a certain time period. This 
uncertainty is due to the existence of time-lag in production and sales. The buyer's 
optimization problem is equivalent to the 2-stage process, whereby first an optimization 
portfolio is chosen to yield a given total import level (Q). Then in the second stage, the 
proper balance is struck among outputs, non-risky inputs and the total amount of the risky 
input (Q). Because we are only interested in the choice of the portfolio of suppliers of the 
risky input, the focus is on the first stage. The optimal portfolio is based only on the import 
price, since the revenue side for the buyer needs not be considered with the homogeneous-
product assumption. The value of the portfolio, denoted as (=Zs°w.), is then defined as 
the smn of prices (w, ) weighted by optimal quantity shares (Sj°). 
In the above model of import diversification, WK (pp. 532-535) show that we may 
derive an equilibrium relationship similar to the CAPM between the expected price (WJ) and 
the measure of risk (P °) of any supplier i's price relative to the value of optimal portfolio 
(JV o). The set of optimal portfoho (sj°'s, for all j = 1,.., n) is analogous to the market 
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portfolio and p ° is analogous to the market-specific measiire of risk on the rate of return to a 
security i in the CAPM. Copeland and Weston (1988) and Black (1993) show the derivation 
of the market security line of a minimum-variance zero-beta portfolio. Based on the same 
logic, the relationship in the real asset (e.g., import) allocation model is expressed as follows: 
(1) W; =E(iv,) + (E(irj-E(w,))Pi°. 
Wj (sE( w,)) is the expected import price (in other words, the expected monetary value of 
buying one unit of the product i (q^)), and E( w,) is the expected value that the importer 
would be willing to pay for a riskless product (q^) which in turn yields the lowest expected 
return to the buyer. E(W J is the expected value of the optimal portfolio, and, the magnitude 
of risk is defined as 
cov(W^^w.) 
' var(#J 
Equation (1) is exactly parallel to the CAPM except that (a) E( w,) has replaced the 
rate of return on the risk-free asset and (b) the measure(Pj°) of risk for each vi>., in the context 
of real asset allocation, is based upon the relative value of the market portfolio instead of 
the market rate of retum. The difference between Equation (1) and the CAPM formula for 
the minimum-variance zero-beta portfolio is that w. is not the rate of retum of firm i's 
securities as in the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM, but the cost of purchasing q, to the buyer in this 
model of diversification. The market price of risk, E(W J- E( w,), is negative because the 
expected value (E( vv,)) of q^ is higher than any other combination of qj's for all j. This 
occiurs because the purchasing firm is willing to pay more for an input with a less risky price. 
Thus, Wj has a negative linear relation with P" and has the highest value at E( iv.) in which 
risk premimn (s (E( w, )-E( W Ji)/ E( W J) needs not be paid and P ° = 0, as suggested by 
Equation (1). 
The measure (Pi°) of each price risk relative to W^is derived from the purely price-
based portfolio of the investor, and thus the products purchased must be considered to be 
homogeneous. This negative relation, due to the importer's incentive to diversify away the 
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risk, however will not strictly hold for some products purchased, if there is any collusive 
behavior among suppUers. Also, if products are imperfect substitutes, then the importer 
may consider more the monopolistic power of certain varieties of products over their price 
risk in his decision-making. To allow for the heterogeneity of imports, we first need to 
redefine the value of the optimal portfolio, and the measure of risk as a consequence, by 
taking into account the suppliers' impact on the observed equilibrium price. WK's model 
concerns only the buyer's perspective of 'input cost' minimization under price uncertainty in 
deriving the optimal portfoUo, and this will no longer be consistent with pricing behavior due 
to the heterogeneous returns of products purchased. 
n.2. Supplier's Market Power vs. Risk 
n.2.1. Monopolistic Market Power 
Given the shortcomings of the price-only-based analysis, re-define the optimal value of 
the market portfolio as W* (=ZSi*Wi). s*, or a set of sj^'s for i=l,..,n, stands for the 
optimal mixture of quantity shares with the non-homogenity of products, and it must be 
different firom s", the optimal set of shares for the homogeneous products, due to different 
returns from each product in the importer's revenue. This specification of optimal shares 
yields the corresponding market specific risk 
cov(fF*,>v.) ~ 
P.* (= ^ J '^)  r e l a t i v e  t o  W * .  
wai(W*) 
A specific derivation of the set of sj*'s is not feasible, imless the output/input market 
structure of the importing firm is known. The specific structure is not necessary however in 
this stage of analytic study, since fF • is a hypothesized value similar to the market rate of 
retum in the CAPM'. The objective of this theoretical section is to model a measure of 
market power (uj) of the suppUer i to have some degree of linkage to (3j*, by examining first 
the relationship between Uj and the systematic risk or non-diversifiable risk (say PJ of the 
supplier. 
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Because the vectors of prices and Pi*'s are the equilibrium values in the real market, we 
may derive the systematic risk of the import price as a fimction of the supplier's market 
power within the context of the supplying firm's optimality conditions. The analytic part 
generally follows the basic model of Sun (1993) and Chen et al. (1986) at this section, and is 
combined with the P;* in Section II.2.2 to modify the model to represent the analysis of 
demand diversification. For this purpose, assume that a shareholder wealth-maximizing, 
price-setting firm, or suppUer, operates for a single period afterwhich it is dissolved at zero 
salvage value. There are no taxes, or bankruptcy, or agent costs, and Modigliani-Miller 
capital structure applies. The firm produces a single product and the firm's factor demand 
does not affect the stochastic distribution of the price. Money capital is raised in a financial 
market characterized by Sharpe-Lintner equilibrium. A constant marginal cost and average 
cost function are assumed for simplicity, since the focus is on the output price (or input price 
for an importing firm) itself, in which several suppliers compete in a single market in this 
import diversification model. 
Among the suppliers, we consider an arbitrary supplier i, in the market, producing 
product Qj and facing the following stochastic revenue fimction^, 
(2) . 
qi(W, I) is the conditional demand for the commodity i (firom suppUer i) by importing firm, e, 
is a stochastic component of the firm i's output price(vi/.) and is independent of the quantity 
sold(qj) with E(e. )=0. Outputs of each supplier are possibly non-homogeneous or imperfect 
substitutes within the same group of the commodity, and thus the monopolistic power may be 
exercised. The notation indicates an nxl vector of the variable, Wj is expected price of 
product i in terms of the buyer's currency, and I represents the total expenditure on all 
products. A single variety for each supplier is assumed, and suppliers treat the prices of the 
other suppliers as fixed; i.e., they are Bertrand maximizers. 
A linear technology is assumed, calling for capital (KJ and labor inputs (LJ. In other 
words, capital is exhausted in the production process and its cost is assumed to be (1+r) with 
the constant production relation as K; = bjqj, and also Lj = a^q;. Then, the technology results 
39 
in a constant marginal and average short-run cost(ci), where ai-Kl+r)bj = Cj, in each time 
period. Since the CAPM requires a single-period decision framework, we accordingly 
assume that the firm's assets and production potential are exhausted completely within one 
period. According to the valuation formula provided by the Sharpe-Lintoer CAPM, the 
market value (Vj) of the supplier i is the present value of the net cash flow. The 
corresponding cash flow (h.), net of capital depreciation, and market value are given 
respectively by 
(3) =  ( I +  e i ) - W . - q - c . q ,  , and 
(4) Vi =[£(i,)-^-cov(i;,4,)]/(l + r), 
where X is the market price of risk, r is the risk-free rate of interest, is the stochastic rate 
of return on the capital market portfolio, and is the covariance of e, with the rate of 
return on the market portfolio. 
Vj can be modified in the following way to derive the optimahty conditions of the 
supplying firm. Let^/; be the certainty equivalent of (l+e^), given by vf/; = E(l+e;) -
= 1 - The certainty equivalent price is then (£(>1/,.)- = (E(l+e,) - = 
il/jWj, where is the covariance' between w. and R Using these terms, EHi 
becomes (W; - Ci)qi, and the cov(^,., is expressed as Qi q;. Equation (4) 
thus can be simplified as 
(5) V. = (H/iW.-cJ-qi(W,D/(l+r). 
Since the objective of the supplying firm is to maximize the shareholders' wealth with 
product heterogeneity, the problem is to choose W; to maximize Equation (5), its own present 
market value net of investment(or capital depreciation). Then the first order condition for 
optimization yields the following 
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' ' m, q,  
where ij/jWi is the certainty equivalent price. Define w, aqr' to be u^, the reciprocal 
of the positive elasticity of own demand (qj with respect to the expected price (WJ. The 
condition is then written, in a simpler form, as 
(6) T.PK = 
' ' 1 1-u, 
Since w. is the stochastic price in the decision time and Wj is its expected value, the 
term Uj indicates the market power of the supplier i in the industry in risk-discounted 
expectation form with product varieties. In other words, Uj is the certainty equivalent spread 
uf-W-  ~  C-between price and marginal cost as a proportion of price (« =-^~^—If products are 
i^.W. 
homogeneous and the market is characterized by the perfectly competitive environment, this 
spread should not exist and U; would be zero. Otherwise, the variable is related to 
monopolistic market power of the supplier and is in general less than 1. Without 
uncertainty (i.e., ^/j =1), this is at the level of a single firm Leraer-index (also fi-equently 
defined as —^—), which is widely used in the literature as a measiire of the monopolistic 
I-M, 
power of a firm (Chakravarty, pp. 53). 
£1.2.2. Systematic Risk 
The main concern of this paper is the relationship between P;* and the supplier's 
monopolistic market power (Uj). WK deal with the case of non-existence of market power, 
given that products are perfect substitutes with one another. From their mean-variance 
specification of the importer's utility with product non-homogeneity, the expected vector of 
quantity shares is equal to the optimal vector of quantity shares ^°) based on the first two 
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moments of the series of stochastic prices, conditional on the total import level (Q) and the 
degree of risk aversion (X). That is, 
£(s)=/(^,var9 1(0,2)) =£° . 
In a real asset allocation model, the importer can be thought as an investor in a financial 
security market, and a higher import price decreases the return of its cash flow. The 
expected value and the risk of the actual market portfolio of import shares is a tangent point 
to the efficient firontier of ((^, var ^  |/i ) given a certain utility level (say Uq). And the 
riskless level of the expected price can be obtained once we get the tangency line (See WK, 
pp. 532-4). Using s°, the construction of P ° as a relative price risk measure is feasible, and 
the use of the measure is analogous to the systematic risk, (3;, of the CAPM, as presented in 
Equation (1). 
However, if the monopolistic market power of the supplier i (u^) is present to be non­
zero, then the time-series components of prices are no longer the only factors in deriving 
optimal shares or quantities of the importer. The vector of expected observed shares (s*) 
now has the following implicit functional form 
U) = £* , 
where z represents model parameters of the importer's utility (U), other than the first two 
moments of price, such as importer's production or transaction costs, and the effect of 
product substitutability on the importer's revenue. 
Pj* still represents the systematic price risk of vv,- relative to PF * by its definition. 
But, the vector of the expected prices (W) is no longer a parameter to the importer but is 
treated as a fimction related to (^ z). Thus, the relationship between pj* and u^, as well as Zj, 
may disturb the negative and linear relationship of Equation (1) between P, * and W,. The 
common tangency line between the efficient firontiers of ((W, var^\A.) and a certain utility 
level (Uo) is unlikely to be obtained given the dijfferent frontiers for each supplier, which in 
turn obscures the common constant and negative slope coefficient of Equation (1) in the 
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cross-sectional analysis. This indicates that caution must be given in applying the modified 
CAPM equation of WK to empirical data, if there is any suspicion over the homogeneity of 
the products within a market. 
In conjunction with Section II.2.1, the systematic risk of a finn can be represented as a 
fimction of the principal microeconomic determinants of the firm's operation, especially, the 
firm's certainty equivalent market power Uj, in the following way. According to the CAPM, 
the systematic risk (Pj), or so called as the beta coefficient, of the rate of return on the 
security of the finn i is measured by the relationship between the rate of return J on the 
firm's securities and the rate of return (^ on the capital market portfolio. For an explicit 
form of Pi, similar to the previous literature (e.g., Subrahmanyam et al.), define 
= l,and ^„ = -^-l, where = and 
Financial market participants are interested in the market value of suppliers, Vi(and 
also, and for all i=l, ..,n, while the importer's concern is on the suppliers' market 
prices in his demand diversification problem. In the equilibrium analysis of an import, or 
any demand, diversification, the capital market rate of return can be restated with W * 
(=Zvv,- • s* ), the monetary value of an importer's optimal demand portfolio as follows. 
i 
Given the industry (or the import market in this paper)-specific portion of the CAPM market, 
we may express the CAPM market rate of return (^^J as an expectation- and variance-
independent fiaction (say ) of the rate of return of the industry (say R^): 
K = Kp -fp . where R„^ -
mp 
Note that, by the independence assumption, the rate of return on aggregate securities in the 
import market {R^) is defined within the market of n suppliers. Furthermore, the optimal 
weighting of in the specific-market is determined by the investor (i.e., the importer) in the 
real market. We then have, by aggregating over all suppliers for , 
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Z( iv . -c , )^;  Q(W'-Ic -s ' )  (7) R^=-^— ^-1 , y  J  mp y y 
mp mp 
where Q is the total optimal import demand at the time-period, and is expressed as 
—^ Q-M* from Equation (5), where M* is -  c,  )5*. 
\  + r  '  
Under this set-up, we may relate P; (= the systematic risk of the rate of return on the 
security i relative to market portfolio) to Pj* (s supplier i's price risk relative to 
W *(= Z w,. - 5*)) via simple manipulations. By the CAPM definitions of P; and RPj is 
I 
given by 
.ON a _ _ cov(;r, ) W,q] „ 
\ / Pi  1 
n  n  t  n  I 
On the other hand, the independence assiraiption of R^p from R^ yields 
^ fQijQ^^g tjjg covariance analysis provided by Bohenstedt and 
f '  •  var/?„„ J  p  tnp  
Goldberger (1969). Based on the definitions of Ri and Pj*, and the relationships for 
(Equation (7)) and Vj (Equation (5)), we then obtain 
(9) A = L 1l 
K-'P  '  / 
cov(w.,i?^) q] V„p cov(w.,,Pr*) 
var( i2„J  f .V .  Q-  va iW* 
Vl  mp 
Vn.q'i . . M* ^ 
= • B B — f f .  .  
LQV, fM^-cd ' 
- ~ ~ M* 
where /„ indicates the expected /„, is the variance of R„, and is a suppUer-
m. 
specific value aroimd one. 
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In sum, without perfect knowledge of the import market structure, the derivation of s* 
is not feasible. From the supplier's perspective, however, it is possible to draw a fimctional 
form of W, to which Section n.2.1 is devoted. Note that the supplier's optimality condition 
(Equation (6)) is based on the equilibrixmi model assumption that supplier's revenue function 
(Equation (2)) directly reflects the importer's preference over that product. Now, we may 
express the explicit form of (3 *, by combining Equation (8) and (9), with some model 
parameters that affect the equilibrium relationship of demand diversification as 
(10) 
varJT* 
or simply, fi-
* 
1 
1 
1- " .  
1-M. 
Equation (10) summarizes one way of analyzing the equilibrium relationship between 
key determinants of pj* in the import market under price uncertainty, when the assumption of 
product homogeneity is released. The value of u, is generally less than 1, as mentioned 
below Equation (6). Equation (10) shows that Pj* is positively related to u^ (or ——), the 
l-«. 
supplier i's monopolistic power in the certainty equivalent form, under the normal condition 
of positive In an extreme, P;* is a monotonically increasing flmction of —-—, if the 
1-M, 
demand shock (e,. in Equation (2)) happens to be a common economy-wide source of 
xmcertainty, and if we have the same marginal production costs (Cj) over all suppliers. Note 
that by virtue of using the CAPM as the description of the security market equihbrium, we 
are assvmiing that the firm is in the competitive position in the capital market. The positive 
relationship arises because the existence of Uj in excess of zero generates a higher expected 
price per unit of (the suppliers' capital-market) risk, implied by and not fi-om any 
noncompetitive access to the capital market (Chen, pp. 70)"*. 
Also, Pi* is positively related to Ofja, the covariance of the stochastic demand term 
with the rate of retum on the market portfoUo, which is supposed to be positive in general. 
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This says, the relative risk of price is higher if its stochastic movement is highly correlated 
with the capital market movement of the rate of retum. Since or the covariance 
LO- + r) 
term between (e,,, W, ), is the positive fraction of (expressed as a--j„ 
M * 
in our model), an increased value of <y(e(i).w) indicates a lower diversification effect or 
existence of higher risk premium of the product imported in the CAPM context. Thus, a 
high value of generally indicates that imports of such products do not induce a good 
hedge(i.e., a lower risk of portfolio) against the market price variation. However, the 
implication is more complicated than this, since is also positively associated with 
actual price(H'i), partially due to existence of the maiket power, and/or the high quantity 
share(si) of the product i. 
Equation (10) also shows that we may express net risk measure ((3°) relative to fT* as 
a fraction of P;*. This simple orthogonal decomposition visualizes how much of the import 
price variation is explained by the risk measure given W * and how much is directly 
attributable to the existence of the monopolistic market power of the suppliers in the import 
diversification analysis. Derivation of a pure risk measure, independent of U;, is not feasible, 
since U; itself indirectly affects W *,  but the P" refers to the net systematic risk term of p;*, 
conditional on observed W *. Under the existence of market power in a normal sense (i.e., 
0< u^ <1), we observe the positive departure of P;* from P °, and the spread increases in 
correspondence to the increased u^. That is, if products are the perfect substitutes with each 
other, or if the certainty equivalent market power virtually does not exist (i.e., u^ <0), then the 
resxilting P;* in general becomes less than that with the market power at the equilibriimi. 
In Sim, this section shows how price risk is related to the suppliers' market power. It 
thus provide one the theoretical foundation to justify a relevant empirical research, for 
instance, our example of the Chinese wheat import diversification, studied in the following 
section. The key point here is again the supplier's power positively affects the measure of 
Pi*, and thus disturbs the CAPM-type negative equilibrium relationship between pj* and the 
expected price (W;). The degree of significance of the market power in a demand analysis is 
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an empirical issue. But this theoretical section examines one way to extend the firamework 
of WK, which entirely depends on the issue of importer's risk diversification, based on their 
concept of the systematic risk measure (Pj*) relative to the value of the market portfolio. 
in. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION: WHEAT IMPORTS IN CHINA 
m.l. Background and Statement of Problems 
This paper analyzes the Chinese wheat import market, using the model developed in 
this paper to test its empirical appUcability. China is one of the world's largest wheat 
producers, and, at the same time, is a major importer in the world wheat maricet. In the 
marketing year of 1994/95, China imported 10,056 thousand metric tons of wheat, 
accounting for 10.8 % of the world wheat trade. The China National Cereal, Oils, and 
Foodstuffs Import/Export Corporation (CEROILS) is the sole state trading agency which 
determines the optimal combination of suppliers in Chinese wheat imports. The total import 
quantity Q is decided by another government agency, MOFERT, an upperstream institute, to 
fill the gap between domestic demand and supply, and CEROILS then chooses the set of 
suppliers given Q. 
According to the agency, the factors that affect the decision of the mixture of suppliers 
include, most importantly, price paid for the imported wheat, and also product quality, as a 
close second, measured by things such as quarantine objects, live insects, dockage and 
protein level. Governmental relationship is another important factor considered by the 
CEROILS, but China in general prefers to maintain flexibility not being restricted by any 
long-term bilateral trade agreement (Crook et al.:1993). Wheat is purchased through three 
mechanisms: long-term (LT) contracts, short-term (ST) contracts, and spot-market purchase. 
China's wheat imports are basically planned on an annual basis, and revised in the medium 
term to fill the unexpected gap between demand and supply. The tendency to engage in LT 
contracts, more than 2 years or so, is in general declining (USDA, China: Agriculture and 
Trade Report), and there is room to re-negotiate the price of LT agreements based upon 
current market conditions. 
There exists the time lag of 1-6 months, even in cash purchases, between when wheat is 
purchased and when it is shipped. Typically the sales activity, more than actual shipments. 
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afifects commodity prices, and the lags are also different by types of wheat (Turner and 
Ruppel: 1993). Thus, as pointed out by WK, there are inherent risk sources in actual import 
prices, due to the lead/lag structure in any form of purchase; fluctuations in exchange rates 
and transportation costs, and demurrage costs associated with the availability of loading the 
cargo immediately upon the arrival at port. Stochastic quahty can be another source of 
import price variation. The dockage level of the US product, for instance, ranges between .4 
- .8% in general compared to .2 - .3% of Canadian and AustraUan wheat. The high dockage 
reduces milling yields and thus raises the price paid on a millable material basis. And it 
also raises the cleaning and fiimigation cost for the government agency because of the 
existence of live insects and Johnston grass seed. These inconsistent quahties provide the 
importing agency another stochastic source for the price re-negotiation after the delivery via 
either deduction from the gross weight or penalties specified in contracts (Crook et al.). 
Wheat types are imperfect substitutes with one another within the same commodity 
group. Thus, it is natural to consider the monopolistic market power of suppliers, as well as 
the time-series components of stochastic price in the analysis of a model of diversification®. 
These market conditions make the wheat import market a challenging empirical application 
of the theoretical model. There are many theories on modeling oligopoly pricing. This 
paper postulates Bertrand play for the suppliers, and thus any non-competitive pricing 
behavior is simply expressed as u^ (or 1/(1- uj). Also, our model of the Chinese wheat 
import market is based on the Armington assumption, which differentiates wheat by coimtry 
of origin (Larue and Lapan: 1992). There are some criticisms against the Armington 
assiamption, but it avoids the complexity raised from the case of multi-class wheat export by 
a single country (e.g., US), given the shortcomings of specific data available. Thus the price 
an importer is willing to pay for a unit of wheat also depends on exporter reputation, which 
shoidd be reflected in the measure of Uj. 
Data on monthly wheat import prices for China, measured in the Chinese currency unit, 
yuan, and annual import quantities from major exporters are obtained from several sources 
such as World Wheat Statistics, and USD A: China: Agriculture and Trade Report. Over the 
last two decades or so, China imported four classes of wheat: durum, hard spring, hard 
winter, and soft wheat. Since durum wheat accounted for less than one percent in most 
48 
marketing years, only the other three classes are considered in this paper. Import prices are 
measured in yuan per metric ton, and are deflated by the consumer-price-index of China. 
Figure 1 exhibits actual price series for three major suppliers (which account for almost 90% 
of the total supply) of Canada, US, and Australia. Further, Table 1 summarizes mean and 
standard deviations of import prices and quantity shares for all five supphers. 
7 
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Figure 1. Actual price-series for three major suppliers 
The first column of the table shows the mean and standard deviation of wheat import 
prices for China during the seventeen years (1978:7-95:6), while the second column shows 
the first two moments of quantity shares for the same period. The last column in the table 
exhibits the mean of the quality-adjusted prices in the sense of ad hoc premiimi margin. In 
this case, ten dollars are subtracted firom the Canadian and Australian prices, which is the 
approximate monetary value, according to the survey by Crook et al., that CEROILS officials 
consider as the premium margin between the US and these two suppliers, due to their equally 
superior quality. Also, five dollars are added to the price of low quality EEC and Argentina 
products. The importing agent, CEROIL, believes that wheat quality, including its tender, 
clearly reflects the price that the agent is willing to pay for the specific products (See 
Appendix 1 for more description of the data). 
As exhibited in the table, China imported wheat simultaneously fi^om several major 
exporters who charge different prices. There were instances in the data when the price from 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for prices and quantity shares (1978:7-1995:6) 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
Suppliers Mean (import price) Mean Quantity 
Sliare(%) 
Mean of import price 
- quality-adjiisted 
Argentina 3.7 (.474) 5.5 (.044) 3.813 
Australia 4.23 (.916) 19.8 (.144) 4.013 
Canada 4.18 (.7) 37.2 (.103) 3.954 
EC 3.34 (.489) 5.2 (.054) 3.462 
USA 3.6 (.365) 32.8 (.173) 3.599 
Source: World Grain Statistics and USDA: China: Agriculture and Trade Report, Situation and Outlook Series. 
one exporter was consistently above other exporters' for an extended period of time, yet 
China continued to import highly priced wheat. This appears to violate the criterion of 
expected cost minimization. An attempt to explain this observation suggests, following 
WK's logic, that China may tradeoff the level of import cost against its variability in the 
decision of allocating total imports across available exporters in each decision time period. 
That is, by importing from a variety of exporters, China is diversifying away some of the 
price risk associated with satisfying demand from the single exporter with the least level of 
expected price. Another explanation of course involves the quality issue where Chinese 
shows a higher preference for certain types of products. As noted, this paper's objective is 
to figure out interactions between two explanations, based on the idea that the unstable 
mixtures of suppliers are associated with the combined effects of the price fluctuations and 
product preference. 
Overall, the observations from Table 1 call into questions against the expected cost 
minimization model of input choice. Specifically, the import prices of the Canadian and 
Australian wheat are above all those of other suppliers even after the quality premium of $10 
relative to the US is applied. These prices are the most volatile among the price time series, 
yet the two coimtries supply the average of 37% and 20% respectively. A second 
observation is that the US price is consistently low with the least price variability among 
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other suppliers during the sample period, but the average quantity share of the US is less than 
that of Canadian and most importantly is the most unstable. Even though our major concern 
is on the three major suppliers (which account for almost 90% of the total supply), the final 
observation is that export share of the US is about three times larger than that of EC and 
Argentina combined, even if these two suppliers are able to charge about the same low price 
as US with a relatively low price variability in the market. 
in.2. Empirical Methods and Results. 
This section is developed to justify import diversification behavior, by answering these 
questions raised firom Table 1, mostly based on the estimation of the net price risk 
measure(P °) relative to FT *, and the measure of certainty equivalent monopolistic market 
power of suppliers (uj. As an initial step, our basic methodology for estimating the time-
conditional expected import prices for the five suppliers is based on a vector autoregression 
(VAR) firamework representation of a number of variables, which constimte a rather large 
subset of full information set that is available to market participants. The non-structural 
VAR approach is widely accepted in a short-run forecasting and has the desirable property, in 
examining the interrelationships among a set of economic variables, that all variables of price 
series are treated symmetrically, so that we rely neither on any incredible identification 
restrictions nor on the issue of stationary of VAR variables in a significant manner (Doan: 
1992). Details of the estimation are reported® in Appendix 2. 
Given the series of expected import prices, the next step is to obtain estimates of other 
key variables, such as pj* and u^ for all five suppliers. W * is defined as the sum of optimal 
quantity share (s*^) multiplied by actual price ( over the five suppliers at any time t, but 
the actual shares (s\t) are used instead as proxies for s*; j. That's because, the optimal 
derivation is not feasible or even undesirable, without sufficient knowledge on the revenue 
and cost structure of the Chinese wheat industry. Also note that the quantity data is 
available only on the annual basis. Thus, we need to convert the frequency of actual and 
expected price data series from monthly into annually by averaging the 12-month periods. 
Given the estimates E, w (=W^J and E, W (= S , • 5°,^,), where Et stands for the time-t 
conditional expectation, we have once more conduct VAR estimations in a similar manner to 
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get the series of }. Since the time-dependent series is defined as 
{cav{w^J,W*)I varOF,*)}, this procedxire is to derive the numerator, - W^t)( -
as well as the denominator, - E,fF'*t^,)-], of the series for all 5 suppliers 
(Appendix 3 shows details of the estimation). 
For the preliminary diagnostics. Table 2 reports the following relationship, in each 
supplier's time-series analysis: 
(1) the correlation between (expected price) and 
(2) the covariance between e, ,, the stochastic component of actual price, and 
(3) the correlation between W; t and the value of the market portfolio (W*). 
Further, for the purpose of cross-sectional comparisons. Figure 2 plots the average value of 
Pit* versus the expected import price (W^^J of the 5 suppliers over the latest 16 years. For 
these comparisons, since pj^ * is determined independent of the total import level (QJ at any 
time t, price series are normalized by their annual sum to eliminate time effects of the 
quantity. 
From the table, the results in general support the implications of the theoretical section. 
In the time series, all normalized expected prices are negatively correlated with their own risk 
measure. This of course indicates the existence of trade-off between the expected return, via 
a lower import price, and the risk, regardless of the level of market power of each supplier. 
In other words, expected prices become lower (higher) to compensate for their increased 
Table 2. Relationships between key variables (in time-series). 
Argentina Australia Canada EC US 
l.corr(Wi,^„ pi,») -.073 -.487 -.085 -.462 -.135 
2. cov ( e-j, PF/ ) »10^ -.289 .065 .198 -1.956 .219 
3.corr(W,,„ W*) -.494 -.089 .829 -.339 .012 
4- (=E,Wi,^i) .974 1.106 1.096 .879 .945 
5. Pu* .021 1.068 .959 .042 .899 
Note: var(FF,*) =2.1(*10^). Wj^^,andpm* are the sample means (1979-94). 
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(decreased) systematic risk of price relative to the value of market portfoho. The table also 
shows apparent positive cov(e^j,W'), covariance between e-j and W*, for the three major 
suppliers of Canada, US, and Australia, which accoimt for almost 90% of total supply. 
According to our theoretical model, a positive cov( , W'), as a proxy of CTjjn, is associated 
with the existence of market power and/or the significant market share of supplier i in the 
market. Due to the positive relationship between cov(,, W') and P;*, the high covariance 
also implies high values of Pi*'s for the suppliers. 
As predicted, the estimated P;* for the three suppliers are highest among the group, but 
the underlying cause for the value of Pj* for each suppUer is not clear without further 
examinations. That is, the high P* can be due to either market power or significant market 
share of suppliers, or both. Positive correlation of (Wj^p PF ,*) for Canada and US is also 
observed in the time-series. As mentioned in footnote 4, a higher level of market power 
may induce the higher correlation. The estimated market power (Table 3.b) shows the 
highest estimated market power for Canada, which exhibits a considerably higher correlation 
at .829 in Table 2. In sum, the relative risk (P^) does affect the determination of expected 
price, as exhibited in the negative correlation of (Wj p^^ *) in the price time-series of all 
suppliers. However, for our purpose of analyzing the hedging role of products imported, 
similar to the CAPM, suspicions over the values of P;* as a true risk measure, are 
unavoidable as examined in the diagnosis, as well as Figure 2 below. 
1.15 
1.1 - • • 
1.05 -
0.95 ^ US • 
• EC 
0.85 
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Figure 2. Average Expected Price (W;) vs. Beta (Pj*) 
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Figure 2 plots the sample mean of normalized Wj (expected price) and P;* for the 
purpose of a cross-sectional comparison. Unlike the time-series result. Figure 2 does not 
exhibit a negative cross-sectional relationship, as in Equation (1), between average values of 
two variables, W; and Pi*. A positive relationship among suppUers rather seems to appear 
in this scattered graph, and this contrasts to the theoretical and empirical result of WK in their 
apphcation to the Japanese steam coal import market. These examinations may indicate that 
other factors, such as the monopohstic market power of the suppUers, and/or its relationship 
with P^*, are critical in analyzing the cross-sectional behavior of Chinese wheat import 
diversification. 
To examine the effects of the monopolistic market power, the following system of 
conditional demand functions, q^(WJ) in Eqiu.tion (2), is estimated. The econometric 
fimctional form estimated is: 
(12) log^,., =a„+a,.log^,v-, 
H-a,. logW., +(l-a^.)logW~J +a^. logiqll)+a^itrend + h., ; i = 1, ... , 5. 
qj^t., refers to the one-period lagged quantity demanded, is the average normalized 
expected price of non-other than ' is the total quantity imported net of qj^p and is 
the i.i.d regression error. Equation (12) represents a set of demand equations for products 
within the same category. And, the equation says that log(qi J series has been growing(or 
declining) because it has a trend, but would be stationary after defirending (i.e., I a,; | <1). 
Since the explanatory variables are different in each 5 equations with relatively small data 
set, and considering the high contemporaneous correlation in price series, the seemingly 
imrelated regression has been nm to increase the estimation efficiency. The results of 
parameter estimates and standard errors in parenthesis are reported in Table 3.a, and the 
estimated market powers (uj are in Table 3.b. 
Results show that the trend stationary specification is an appropriate one including the 
first-order lagged dependent variable as a regressor, i.e., | a,; | <1, for i=l, ..,5, and is non­
zero at statistically significant levels for most equations. The estimation of parameters is not 
affected whether 'time' is included among the explanatory variables, or whether the variables 
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are detrended before the regression (Johnston and DiNardo, pp. 81; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 
pp. 460). The monopolistic market power(Ui) is obtained from the regression. For the 
short-nm(or impact) estimates, u^jsr) is measured, as defined in the theoretical section, as the 
reciprocal of demand elasticity, - (dlogCqJ/Slog (W;))'' = - (l/a,;). The long-nm (or 
dynamic) market power, u,{m), which is our concern, is measured as /(l - )]~'. This 
is because, the detrended series of log(qj J is the stationary process at AR(1), the series, 
{log(qi^t)- time}, is supposed to have the same value at time t and t-1 in the long-run. 
The estimates of (or qn^jL^, for a sufficiently large t) represent the cross-market demand 
effects, which account for the response of qjj due to changes in total quantity net of q;,. The 
direct use of total expenditure, as a proxy of income level, as a regressor is avoided due to the 
multi-coUinearity problem between explanatory variables, and the effect of changes in 
income or total quantity demand should be reflected in the equation via estimates of trend 
and log (q;^,.,) coefficients. 
In our empirical example, the analysis is limited to only 5 Armington-type suppliers, 
and also to relatively small data set due to the aimual quantity data used. Based on these 
outcomes, however, we may justify the behavior of Chinese wheat import diversification, 
especially, by answering those specific questions mentioned in the last part of Section IH.l. 
From Equation (10), once we achieve estimates for W; and Pj*, we are able to derive an 
estimate for the net risk measure(Pi°) relative to FT*, as a fraction of (3 *, to visualize how 
much of the import price variation is explained by the risk measure and how much is 
attributable to the direct effect of the monopoUstic market power of the suppliers. Table 4 
summarizes the average values of l/(l-uj, expected prices, P *, and P,". The result shows 
that the net systematic risk(p °) of some suppliers (especially, Canada and US) is quite 
different from P,* in a significant manner; i.e., P*(Canidi) is the second largest at .959 contrary 
to P"(cajada) = -426, which is the median value in the whole group, and P"(us) is largest, 
contrary to P*(us)> which is much less than P*(Austraiia)-
Even though the intercept term (E(w.)) of Equation (1) is not a major concern of this 
paper, we derive a time-series of risk premium at time t (RPJ and the plots are exhibited in 
Figure 3. Following Wolak and Kolstad(WK), RP, is defined as 
E(JV^j), where E(JVgj)aDAE(w.j) are expected value for the optimal 
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Tables. Conditional Demand Estimation 
(*,**, statistically significant at 90% and 95% confidence level) 
a. SUR estimation of Equation (12) for the annual data 1978:7-95:6 : 
log qi\RHS aoi(constant) a,i(log qi.,.,) ao.i(log WJ A3i(log qi') a4j(trend) 
Argentina -9.79(10.2) -.36(.25)* -13.4(6.5)** 2.54(1.4)** -.31(.l)** 
Australia 12.8(1.63)** .36(.15)** -4.24(1.4)** -1.06(.2)** .04(.03) 
Canada 8.24(2.15)** -.17(.17) -2.11 (.98)** .21(.19) .OOl(.Ol) 
EC -29.4(10.0)** .04(.22) -2.04(5.09) 4.21(1.2)** .19(.09)** 
US 5.08(8.95) .46(.19)** 8.06(8.52) -.11(1.18) .06(.ll) 
b. Estimated market power (u^) and quantity response elasticity (qnj 
^fLR) %SR) 
Argentina .102 .075 1.865 
Australia .151 .235 -1.652 
Canada .556 .474 .176 
EC .471 .49 4.372 
US -.067 -.124 -.199 
1. [1/(1 -Uj(iji))] is an alternative measure of power, rather than Uj, and the magnitudes are ranked in the order 
of 0.937(US) < 1.113(Arg.) < 1.178(Aust) < 1.892(EC) < 2.25(Can.). 
2. quj refers to the changes in qj with respect to the change in q^"' in percentage term, and qrijfSR) is simply a,;. 
risky portfolio and for the riskless portfolio, respectively, as introduced in Equation (1). In 
other words, the value of RP, is the negative of the ratio of market price of risk, 
) ~ expected market price for the risky portfolio. The series of RPj 
in this paper is measured in a rough manner after adjusting market power effects in observed 
and forecasted prices, based on our estimates of W, and market power(Ui). Also note that 
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Table 4. Summary of estimation results 
Argentina Austraha Canada EEC US 
1/(1-Ui) 1.112 1.178 (3) 2.25 (1) 1.892 0.937 (5) 
3.703 4.23 (1) 4.182 (2) 3.346 3.599 (4) 
Pi* .021 1.068 (1) .959 (2) .043 .899 (3) 
Pi- .019 .907 (2) .426 (3) .022 .959 (1) 
Note: These are average values over the relevant time: 79.7-94.6. 
Normalized Wj values reported in Table 2. 
Parentheses: the magnitude order of the corresponding variable for the three major suppliers. 
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Figure 3. Risk premium (RPO 
optimal mixture of quantity shares, as well as prices, in these portfolios differ from the set of 
Sj* in PF,*. Thus for the derivation of E(JV^^) and £(w.,), the market power term is first 
adjusted in series, and then the corresponding optimal quantity shares for the five 
suppliers, given the adjusted prices, are calculated in a way similar to WK'. 
InsufBcient credibility on the estimated values of RPt is unavoidable, since the values 
are based on derived outcomes from the previous regressions; i.e., the plots of RP, in the 
figure are only approximated values. But one implication from the analysis is that, the 
57 
importing agency appears willing to pay around 47.5 percent, in average of the sample 
period, above the power-adjusted market price for a supply of wheat having no risk. Also, a 
weak trend of decreasing risk premium is observed in the figure, especially after the late 
1980s. This is consistent with the view that, as the importance of quahty attributes 
increases in the Chinese market as reported by Crook et al., the average premium China is 
willing to pay for wheat with no price risk should decrease. 
Mostly based on the results of Table 4, we now may answer the questions raised early 
about the Chinese wheat import behavior in the following way: 
(1) Recall that one of the questions is on Canada's behavior: the highest price and price 
variance, closely next to Austraha, but the most stable quantity share among the major three 
suppliers (during 1978-95), as simmiarized in Section in.l. For Canada, the strong market 
power seems to be the key explanation why its products maintain sizable market shares in the 
Chinese wheat import market despite their high first two moments of actual price. Results 
show that Canada exercises the most supplying power in a significant way in the Chinese 
wheat market. As mentioned, the effect of market power of Canadian products can be also 
captured firom the results in Table 2, the time-series relationships between key factors of this 
model. Furthermore, within the group of three major suppUers of Canada, US, and 
Australia, the lowest P" value of Canada in a considerable manner indicates that consistent 
imports of Canadian products provide the importer a good hedge against market price 
variation. Thus, the importer takes advantages in risk control and in his preference over 
Canadian products by maintaining sizable and stable shares of the products. 
Estimation restilts show that AustraUan data generally mimics the Canadian, or the US, 
in a less considerable manner; i.e., the second largest u^^lr) (and also Uj(SR)), and the second 
lowest Pi" among the major suppUers. One thing to note is the negative response (aj^^usL) or 
qn^Aust.)) of Austrahan wheat demand with respect to changes in q''(Aust.)> which is highly 
significant and negative in contrast to the rest of suppUers, and this reflects the independence 
of the demand firom the rest of market demands. This may reflect the substitute aspect of 
AustraUan wheat for the other products due to its southem geographical location, based on 
the revision of the Chinese importing agency's annual importing plan to fiilfiU the 
unexpected gap between domestic supply and demand. On the other hand, this negative 
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response, with the highest constant term, may correspond to the gradual decrease of 
Australian share over time (e.g., 20.5% during 1978-85 to 14.3% after 1985) and, thus, the 
share far below that of US in average. Despite its geographical niche (and perhaps its 
superior quaUty), Australian wheat suppliers appear to increase their price way too high over 
time (See Figture 1) enough to loose the significant market occupancy. 
(2) Three aspects are noticeable from the review of US data. First, the US stands on 
the lowest point over all suppliers in terms of its magnitude of Uj(SR) and u^ l^r). Secondly, the 
US has the highest net systematic price risk (P;®), and, finally, exhibits the considerable 
negative sensitivity (qnj toward the increase in q"'(us)> total market demand net of US(i.e., the 
estimated value of qn^u&LR) = -• 119 < 1.865 (Argentina),. 176 (Canada)). Overall, it seems 
like that the US products are not a primary choice within the group of major suppliers. The 
observations imply that, (a) its monopoUstic market power is the lowest among the entire 
group, (b) imports from the US do not help stabilizing the market price risk despite its low 
price and the least price variability among the whole suppliers, and (c) its demand is 
negatively subject to the expansion of overall market demand at the given time. The third 
observation indicates that the substitute role, rather than a primary choice, of the US product, 
without having the geographical advantage like Australia. All of these results appear to be 
proper sources explaining the reason why US share is less than that of Canadian in average 
and most importantly is very unstable over time. These factors, especially (a) and (b), must 
be compensated for in terms of a low expected supply price in order for China to have 
significant market demands for the US wheat. 
(3) Even though the focus of this analysis is mostly on the three major suppliers, the 
final question raised early was the significantly higher US share over the combination of 
shares of EEC and Argentina despite about the same low price and price variability. These 
three suppliers are the group that charges the lowest prices and lowest estimated market 
power among the suppliers in the Chinese wheat market. Given the above observations on 
the US estimates, the key answer for the question ^pears to be on the general fact that the 
US is one of the largest wheat producer and exporters in the world with a variety of product 
classes. Note that the estimated price effect (a^fug)) on demands is statistically negUgible for 
the US, and the values of (aj^^s). q%js)) are negative and statistically insignificant unlike the 
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other two suppliers, despite being a major supplier. These examinations give us the idea 
that wheat import from the US is generally treated as the best 'residual' (or 'substitute') in 
terms of its large quantity available and product varieties from the viewpoint of Chinese 
importing agency. In other words, once some base amoimt of wheat is purchased from the 
non-US sources (especially, Canada), CEROILS then appears to allocate a share of all 
additional purchases of several classes to the US, as mentioned in the report by Crook et al. 
(1993). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
WK in their 1991 AER paper demonstrate one way to justify the behavior of import 
diversification by examining a negative relationship between expected import price (W^ and 
systematic price risk (p;*) relative to the optimal market portfolio. This relationship across 
prices is parallel to the idea of the security line of the CAPM, reflecting the importer's 
incentive to diversify away systematic price risk. This article attempts to extend their 
framework by examining the supplier-side influence on the equilibrium price, since WK's 
approach is limited only to the importer's perspective assiuning 'homogeneity' of products 
imported. In the theoretical section of this paper, equilibrium relationships among these key 
explanatory variables, Wj, P;*, and the monopolistic market power (uj, necessary to the 
analysis, are derived by allowing the supplier's optimality conditions within the modified 
firamework of the CAPM. 
The main argument is, if the monopolistic market power of suppliers is present in the 
importing agent's decision-making, then Uj positively affects Pj*. The underlying cause for 
the positive relationship is the increased expected dollar price of risk given the different 
effect on the importer's revenue for each product. The existence of differentiated products 
thus disturbs the negative and linear relationship, which reflects the systematic risk-
diversification effect of the importer, between W; and P;*. And this paper fiiither exhibits 
an orthogonal decomposition of P;* into the net price risk (P °) relative to PT * and the market 
power term to visualize how much of the import price variation is explained by the risk 
measure and how much is attributable to the direct effect of the monopolistic market power 
of the suppliers. 
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As an empirical application in the international trade, the Chinese wheat import market 
is analyzed in Section HI. Observations from the basic statistics of Table 1 provide us some 
specific questions against the criterion of expected cost minimization, for instance, the most 
unstable shares of the US over the sample time-period despite its lowest average price and 
price variability among the suppliers. VAR analysis is adopted to acquire the time-
conditional expectations of each import price series {WJ, and the series of {P;*} given the 
estimates of {WJ. Empirical relationships between the key factors are examined in the last 
part of Section in.2, and the specific questions raised are answered to justify the diversifying 
behavior of Chinese wheat import. The results certainly confirm the theoretical framework 
that the monopolistic market power should be a critical factor, in its way of affecting Wj and 
Pi*, being considered in a demand analysis of non-homogeneous products. In sum, unless 
the market power of all suppliers is virtually neghgible, the analysis purely based on the 
'price-based portfolio' may mislead us in conducting an empirical study of real asset 
allocation model (e.g., import diversification). 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. In the empirical apphcation, we replace the set of sj^'s with the actual shares 
observed without having serious difficulty, since this CAPM type analysis is basically about 
the equilibrium relations for both importer's and suppliers'. 
2. For the paper dealing with output price uncertainty, with known input prices and 
production process, the implicit justification for (only) output price uncertainty is on the 
existence of time-lag between production decision and actual production and sales of output. 
On the other hand, for a rationale for the case of stochastic input price, one might imagine a 
firm taking orders for future delivery of its product at a fixed price. Once committed to 
producing the specific output quantities, actual input prices, especially material input costs. 
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are not known in advance until the inputs are purchased. Most competitive bidding contracts 
generally fall into this class of problem (Blair: 1974). 
3. Note that in the normal case we would expect firms to have positive systematic risk 
so with >0 the certainty equivalent term would be less than one. Consequently, 
uncertain revenue is valued at less than its expected value due to the discount for systematic 
risk (Chen, pp. 60). 
4. To examine a positive relationship between Uj and (3j* in a more intuitive way, 
consider only two suppliers. PF * is the sum of s,* vi>, and 52*^, or (1- s,*)^,, where s,* 
and s,* are the optimal shares for the supplier 1 and 2 with stochastic prices w, and w,. 
For the supplier 1 with higher market power, an increase in w, will lead to the higher increase 
in W* than the case with a lower or without market power. That's because of (1) the direct 
effect (i.e., W, is higher with market power), and (2) the indirect effect (i.e., the decrease in 
s,* is smaller (and so is the increase in s,*)). Note that Pj* is independent of the level of Q, 
and that s,* is less sensitive to the price changes, given qi's monopolistic effect in the market 
of Q. In other words, the changes in(vv',-PF*)is lower with more market power than the 
changes without or small degree of market power. Thus, given var( W *), cov(vi>„ W *) 
becomes larger with market power due to the close stochastic movements in var( W *) and 
cov(w„ JF*), and Pi*, cov(h'„ FT •)/var( JF *), becomes larger toward one. 
5. The measure of Uj is estimated from an econometric model of systems of demand 
equations in our empirical apphcation (Section in.2). But in the future research, Uj might be 
driven by qualitative analysis (for instance, hedonic price functions), which would be the 
direct way to address the problem of heterogeneous product qualities. Alternatively, we 
may be able to acquire a relative measure of quality from a survey for time-dependent 
preferences over products, which might be even more accurate, since trades in agricultural 
products are significantly subject to the non-economic reasoning, such as trade embargo. 
6. For the possible cointegration between series of prices, Dickey-Fuller and 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are first performed under various specification of the model 
to infer the number of unit roots (if any) in each of the variable. Tests show that price series 
of Canada, Argentina, and Australia are 1(1) process while those of EC and US are stationary 
in 1(0) process. This failure of cointegration in the first-stage can be also acknowledged 
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from the VAR analysis in the sense of existence of (1) the high contemporaneous correlation 
among variables, and (2) the tendency to lead (i.e.. Granger-cause) the market price by some 
price series(e.g., US). - See Appendix 2 for a detail. 
7. The first set of optimal shares inEiW^j) correspond to the solutions of solving the 
problem of maximizing the agent's expected utihty of profit, while restricting the ex-ante 
utility to the mean-variance (MV) specification and assuming non-existence of suppliers' 
monopohstic market power(Equation (8) and (10) in WK). The second optimal mixture of 
shares iaE(w^^) indicates the portfoUo of suppliers, which has no market risk, given the 
risky prices. To compute this portfolio, WK solve for the minimum-variance weighted-
average price subject to the constraint that its covariance with , is zero. The solution is 
shown in Equation (25) in WK. The calculation of these two types of optimal shares in this 
paper is strictly based on their equations (Equation (8) and (25)), while assuming, instead of 
estimating, the risk coefficient (X) to be .75 (Black: 1993). For the detail of derivation of the 
shares, consider WK's 1991 paper, and for the empirical procedure of this paper, consider 
Appendix 4. 
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APPENDICES 
1. Import Price Data 
The import price quoted in this article includes both transportation costs and average 
exchange rates because the importing agency should be interested in importing prices. The 
U.S. has started an export-aid program, so called as Export Enhancement Program (EEP), to 
reduce its wheat export price to Qiina since the early beginning of 1987, and these 
arrangements of price were made in the set of US price data. Thus the US export price data 
is the average of the three classes (reported in World Wheat Statistics) adjusted by the EEP 
bonus rate, which is calculated as the ratio of unitary export value (reported in the series of 
Wheat Situation and Outlook) over the average price. The EC uses the common market 
restitution program to cut ofif the price of agricultural exports to specific coimtries, and these 
prices net of export reflmds can be directly obtained from the WWS. Canada operates the 
central wheat board that fimctions as a monopoly outside normal market channels, and, with 
this agency, is able to utilize its positions to guarantee special quahty characteristics and/or 
lower prices. Specific data for the price-cutting program in Canada is not however available 
to the public. As a result, it's a common method to apply the same rate of EEP of the US, to 
Canadian, as well as Australian, price set, which is done in this paper. 
2. Estimatioii of Expected Price in a VAR 
For the estimation of expected price, consider the following system of equations: 
(a) , fori=l,..., 5 ; 
7=1 7=1 
w^ = the actual Chinese wheat import price from the i-th suppher at time t, 
Cj = the 1x15 vectors containing a constant, 11 seasonal (monthly) dummy variables, a time 
trend, and two level dummies to account for the Chinese currency (yen) depreciation 
(1994:1) and the subsidy program (1987:7), 
p = the number of lags for the endogenous variables, 
a,Tg = coefficient for the k-th endogenous variable (i.e. wj with j-th lags for the dependent 
variable Wj^j-
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= independently and identically distributed disturbance terms, while E(ei^p e^ J for all i, j, 
is not necessarily zero. 
The issue of whether the variables in a VAR need to be stationary exists. Doan(1992), 
for instance, recommended against differencing or the use of a deterministic time trend. The 
trend dummy is included however in this estimation since the detrending yields the best 
diagnostics. Also, the monthly dummies are initially included given the data on the 
monthly basis. The coefficient estimates are of particular interest in a VAR. If, for 
example, all coefficients of a^,, for all j=l,.., p, are zero, then the knowledge of the w^ series 
does not reduce the forecast error variance of Wj series. Formally speaking, {w^} does not 
Granger cause {w,}, and, unless there is a contemporaneous response of (w^jto {wJ, the 
{Wj} series evolves independently of {wi^}. If, instead, any of the coefficients in these 
polynomials differ from zero, there are interactions between the two series. 
Each equation is estimated using the lag lengths of 12, 6, and 3 months. Because each 
equation has identical right-hand-side variables, ordinary least square (OLS) is an efficient 
estimation technique. Using x'-tests, it appears that the length of 12 is the most appropriate 
choice. In addition to that, alternative test criterion to determine the appropriate length 
and/or the seasonality are the multivariate generalization of the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBIC; Enders, pp. 315), and the criterion is to 
choose the model with the lowest value of these statistics. Table A. 1 shows that AIC is the 
lowest in the model of 12 lags without the seasonal dummies but SBIC draws the preference 
over the model of same lags with dummies. Among them, since we fail to reject the null of 
the model without seasonal dvumnies at 1% significance level with x"-tests, we decided to 
choose model (4) in the table. 
Although the objective of the VAR analysis in this section is to acquire the time-
conditional expectations of each price series, we obtained the variance decomposition, using 
the orthogonalized innovations obtained from a Choleski decomposition to ascertain the 
importance of the interactions between the 5 price series. Variance decomposition are 
presented in Table A.2 for two orderings; that based on the relative shares of suppUers (I: 
Can., US, Aust., Arg., EEC) in average, and an ordering based on the relative average price 
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(11: Aust., Can., Arg., US, EEC), for the 24-month forecasting horizons. The forecast error 
variance decomposition tells us the proportions of the movements in a sequence due to its 
own shocks versus shocks due to the other variables. Given the high contemporaneous 
correlation (for example, the correlation between e^^, and eAost, 0.474), the order of the 
variables in the factorizations have significant influences on the results. 
Granger-causality tests are also performed for all incidences and are reported in the 
parenthesis of Table A.2. An interesting hypothesis to examine is whether the price 
movements in Canada, as a share leader in average, or Australia, as a price leader, have a 
tendency to lead (i.e.. Granger-cause) movements in the other markets. The tests indicate, 
however, that both are not the case and conclude in favor of the restricted model of these two 
variables for most of the equations. Nonetheless, certain features do stand out from these 
outcomes, combined with the analysis of the impulse response functions, which show the 
response of each variable to a unit innovation in the others. The price movements of the US 
and EEC, rather. Granger causes other suppliers' price, as seen from the tests, in which it 
may also be visualized in the impulse response fimctions due to the high effects of their 
innovations, especially the US, to own and to the others. Australia seems to be the most 
active to/from international influences in the sense that it is affected by the feedback from the 
US and EEC, but also has fairly high percentage of the variance decomposition to most cases 
in both orderings. Argentina, and perhaps Canada, on the other hand, appears to act as a 
Table A. I. Tests for lag-length and seasonal dummies 
(** reject the null of restricted model at 5% significance level) 
Model\test-stat. AIC SBIC X"-tests (altemative 
to model(l) 
(1) 12-lag length 2.156 -5.934 
(2) 6-Iag length 3.499 -7.030 363.04** 
(3) 3-lag length 3.976 -7.773 197.59** 
(4) 12-lag w/o 
seasonal dimimies 
2.088 -6.897 60.77 
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Table A.2. Forecast error variance decomposition (24-month) and Granger-causality tests 
(F-statistics) in the parenthesis 
(** reject the null of restricted model at 5% significance level) 
LHS\RHS Argentina.. Australia Canada EEC US 
variables ordermg(I / II) a / H )  a / n )  a / n )  a / n )  
Argentina 24.1 121.1 24.8 / 32.7 # 22.4 / 7.4 # 20.2 / 20.2 8.7/17.5 
(25.41»*) (1.36) (0.49) (9.85**) (2.34**) 
Australia 7.5/4.6 38.0/46.8 26.7/5.1 # 17.4/17.4 10.4/26.1 
(1.11**) (35.74**) (1.66) (16.54**) (3.29**) 
Canada 1.2! 1.0 18.8/42.7 48.4/14.5 12.1 / 12.1 17.5/28.6 
(2.94**) (1.10) (29.91**) (10.91**) (2.98**) 
EEC 17.1 / 16.2# 18.1/27.6# 20.3 / 9.4 # 36.0 / 36.0 8.5/10.8 
(1.17) (1.56) (1.50) (3.48**) (2.29**) 
US 11.5/9.7 21.5/39.0# 35.4/ 11.2# 18.4/18.4 13.3/21.7 
(2.75**) (1.59) (0.60) (11.89**) (15.27**) 
follower, reacting innovations in other price, rather than its own innovations having an 
influence on the others (Enders; Mills). 
Since the interrelationship of price movements is not the major concern for the VAR 
analysis here, combined with outcomes of Table A.2, we re-estimated Equation (a) while 
restricting all the coefficients of the variables marked as (#) in the table to get the time-
conditional expectations of each price series. Note that the re-estimation is necessary since 
the forecasts fi-om an unrestricted VAR are known to suffer firom over-parameterization. 
The estimation of seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) would be the appropriate choice, 
given the non-identical structure of the right-hand-side variables. Finally, the fitted values 
for each price equation are assiraied to be the expected import price series and are used for 
the later estimation purpose. 
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3. Brief Description on Estimation of 
Time t-conditional series of (3^* is defined as {E,[Ni^J / for all i =1, ..,5 
suppliers, where and indicate [( w W - E, FT and [(W -
E,FF*^,)^]), respectively. Since we have already obtained series of and (D^,)" fi-om the 
estimation of expected prices (i.e., for i=l,.., 5), the next step is to derive the time-
dependent expectation of these series. To do so, two separated vector auto-regressions, say 
V, and Vn, without any restriction, of order one are run: one for five Nj, series and the other 
for the six series of [(D^.,)^] and [(- W^J-] for 5 suppliers. Formally, these two 
m 
systems of equations we will estimate are expressed as, , =c, + Z a-jrhs- ,_i +/;,. For the y=i 
regression V,, i is 1,..,5 , and m=5, and, for Vu, i=l,..,6 and m=6. And, Ihs and rhs variables 
are numerators and denominator(s) of as defined above, while q = the 1x2 vector 
containing a constant and time trend, a^j = coefficient for the j-th endogenous variable(i.e. rhsj) 
with first lag for the dependent variable IhSj^p = independently and identically distributed 
disturbance terms, while ECej^p ej J for all i, j, is not necessarily zero. 
Limited number of 17 annual observations restricts the VAR analysis to be order one. 
The denominator of is the common value for the series, but the series of [( w j^^., - j)*] 
for 5 supphers are included in the second VAR to increase the estimation efficiency. For 
each regression, 'forecast error variance decompositions (4-year forecasting horizon)' and 
Granger-Causahty tests are reported in Table B. 1.1 and Table B. 1.2. Based on these results, 
the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is run, and the results are also reported below in 
Table B.2.1 and Table B.2.2 for each regression. Note that the re-estimation is necessary 
due to over-parameterization of the unrestricted VAR, and that the fitted values are used to 
estimate Pi*-series for the five suppliers. 
4. Risk Premium 
Derivation of the series is based on previous estimates of market power-adjusted prices. 
As mentioned, the first set of optimal shares in £(FF^^) corresponds to the solutions of 
solving the problem of mayimiring the agent's expected utility in a MV specification. The 
only difiference between WK's equations (8 or 10) and this paper is that, risk coefficient (A.) is 
assimied to be .75, following Black (1993), instead of restricting XjQt being a constant over 
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Table B. 1.1. Forecast error variance decomposition (4-year horizon) for the ntimerators (V[): 
sample period (1978-1994) 
(» statistically significant at 90 or a higher percent confidence level) 
LHS\RHS N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 
N1 92.2 (-.22) 1.0 (.42) 3.5 (-.5) 3.0(-1.05) .27 (.17) 
N2 19.3(-1.29) 48.8(.95) 25.2(.52) 5.1(-2.3*) 1.57(-.58) 
N3 26.6(-1.63) 24.1(.36) 44.3(.74) 4.35(-1.9*) .74(-.34) 
N4 17.1 (-.72) 17.2(1.8*) 47.9(-.26) 15.3(-1.95*) 2.59(-.73) 
N5 15.0 (-.63) 53.9(-.14) 10.4(.82) 2.3(-.59) 18.3(-.38) 
Note: The numbers 1 through 5 indicate Argentina, Australia, Canada, EC, US, respectively. Parentheses 
report Granger-Causahty Statistics (t-value under order one). Further, N(i) = [( vv fV -
E,^%,)]. 
Table B. 1.2. Forecast error variance decomposition (4-year horizon) for denominator (V„) 
LHSNRHS D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 Dm 
D1 97.6 .48 .33 .01 1.08 .47 
D2 7.59 60.6 23.9(1.8*) 2.21(1.7*) 3.39 2.3 
D3 49.6(-2.9*) 10.9 32.7 4.13(-2.9*) 1.58 1.05 
D4 4.15 24.4(8.3*) 32.8 25.7(2.0*) 1.06 12(-4.3*) 
D5 8.36 25.5 9.5 5.26 51.1 .32 
Dm 24.4 34.1 28.8(2.2*) 1.9 3.4 7.3 
Note: D(i) = [( vv - W and Dm = [( FF" - E, i)"]- Parentheses report only statistically significant 
Granger-Causality statistics. 
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Table B.2.1. SUR estimation for numerator of Pj* 
(Yr86 is a dummy variable due to the low market share for US in 1986) 
(* , **, statistically significance at 90 and 95 % confidence level) 
LHS\RHS N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 
Constant .0024 .0035** .0043** -.0042* .0031** 
Trend -.002 -.002** -.002** -.0012* 
Yr86 .0018* 
Nl(-l) -.129 -.201** -.286** -.252 
N2(-l) -.136 -.186 3.15** -.393** 
N3(-l) .353* -.491 
N4(-l) -.074 .297* -.062 -.434* 
N5(-l) .287 
Table B.2.2. SUR estimation for denominator of Pj* 
LHS\RHS D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 Dm 
Constant .0098** .0026** .011** -.017** .003** .0032** 
Trend -.0006* -.00008 -.0006** -.00007 -.00014* 
Yr86 .0015 
Dl(-l) -.148 -.395** -.095* 
D2(-l) -.202 .095 19.01** -.142 -.133 
D3(-l) .153* .265* 3.436* .315** 
D4(-l) -.0081* -.039** .293** 
D5(-l) -.152 
Dm(-l) -13.46** 
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time as in WK, where Q, is the total quantity demanded. The second optimal mixture of 
shares in £(>5.,) indicate the portfolio of suppliers, which has no market risk, given the risky 
prices. For the derivation of shares, this paper strictly follows Equation (25) of WK. These 
optimal shares are reported in Table C. 1 and C.2, respectively. 
To do so, however, we additionally need the variance-covariance matrix of power-
adjusted prices. The matrix is simply measured as the residual covariance matrix by 
conducting a seemingly unrelated regression for the following system of equations: 
/ w -1 ] = constant^i^ + e(i,,) for i=l ,..,5, 
where W,.^; „ and vv denote power-adjusted expected and actual prices, and e;, is an 
error tenn. The results show highly insignificant constant terms, being close to zero, for all 
5 equations and the corresponding matrix is 
1 .  9 1  
-.11 .  9 9  
. 2 9  1 . 1 6  1 . 7 6  
- 2 . 8  - 4 . 4 0  - . 3 5  2 6 . 5  
- . 0 2  1 . 4 4  1 . 7 5  - 7 . 0  2 . 3 7  
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Table C.l. Set of optimal shares mE(Wg^): sample period (1979-94) 
OSl 0S2 OSS 0S4 0S5 
0.00000 0.00000 0.90691 0.093087 0.00000 
0.00000 0.00000 0.87719 0.12281 0.00000 
0.00000 0.00000 0.88135 0.11865 0.00000 
0.00000 0.00000 0.87561 0.12439 0.00000 
0.00000 0.00000 0.89402 0.10598 0.00000 
0.00000 0.00000 0.89730 0.10270 0.00000 
0.00000 0.00000 0.89342 0.10658 0.00000 
0.00000 0.00000 0.89274 0.10726 0.00000 
0.00000 0.00000 0.87646 0.12354 0.00000 
0.01120 0.00000 0.85600 0.13280 0.00000 
0.00000 0.00000 0.88173 0.11827 0.00000 
0.00000 0.00000 0.75844 0.099189 0.14237 
0.00000 0.00000 0.64717 0.10338 0.24945 
0.00000 0.00000 0.69244 0.089811 0.21775 
0.00000 0.00000 0.50717 0.079537 0.41330 
0.00000 0.00000 0.63160 0.093286 0.27511 
OS(i) is the estimated optimal share for supplier i. 
74 
Table C.2. Set of optimal shares ) 
zsl zs2 zs3 zs4 zs5 
0.21738 0.21714 0.21891 0.16081 0.18576 
0.21786 0.21937 0.21567 0.16062 0.18648 
0.21779 0.21924 0.21623 0.16064 0.18610 
0.21771 0.22070 0.21587 0.16054 0.18518 
0.21738 0.21866 0.21753 0.16072 0.18571 
0.21712 0.21895 0.21882 0.16071 0.18439 
0.21709 0.21935 0.21855 0.16068 0.18433 
0.21725 0.21925 0.21832 0.16067 0.18451 
0.21765 0.22087 0.21598 0.16054 0.18497 
0.21785 0.22204 0.21439 0.16044 0.18527 
0.21754 0.22027 0.21647 0.16059 0.18513 
0.21710 0.22017 0.21885 0.16062 0.18327 
0.21718 0.22289 0.21757 0.16042 0.18194 
0.21692 0.21909 0.22027 0.16071 0.18302 
0.21665 0.21751 0.22209 0.16083 0.18292 
0.21695 0.22058 0.21953 0.16060 0.18235 
zs(i) is optimal share for supplier i. 
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CHAPTER 3. PRICE INTERACTIONS IN 
EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH 
A paper prepared to be submitted to the Journal of Business and Economics 
Jeong-Yun Seo 
ABSTRACT 
Recent study of the pass-through has drawn heavily on models of industrial 
organization and emphasized the convexity of demand schedules of the foreign firm. As an 
illustration of the market structure, this study theoretically relates the issue of pass-through 
directly to the oligopoly price conduct, or interactions between a suppUer's price and the 
market price. While focusing on the degree of competitive pressure faced by foreign firms, 
it also examines an empirical example of import beer pricing in the US. Given the open 
debate on the stability of the level of pass-through, the Kalman filter estimation is adapted in 
the empirical appUcation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The underlying rationale for any price interaction model is that a firm's pricing 
decision matters to the market price because of its potential influence on the rival's actions. 
From a realist's point of view, price interactions or barometric price leadership can be 
inevitable consequences in most industries. This study theoretically relates the degree of 
oligopoly conduct in the market price, as well as other factors attributing to the firm's market 
performance, to the issue of incomplete pass-through of exchange rate and cost shocks. It 
also provides an empirical example of import beer pricing in the US. Pass-through analysis 
determines the relationship between exchange rate movements and the adjustments of traded 
goods. This study argues that a foreign firm's decision on the level of pass-through is 
significantly affected by its price interaction with the market price, in a barometric sense, and 
pass-through analysis is overall adversely related to the measure of the competitive pressure 
faced by the foreign supplier. 
Many articles on intemational trade have recently examined the problem of imperfect 
price competition, in particular, on oligopoly pricing that is induced by exchange rate 
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movements. The issue of 'incomplete exchange rate pass-through' refers to the partial 
response of import prices to nominal exchange rates, and 'pricing-to-market' refers to 
destination-specific price adjustments by monopolistically competitive exporters. Exchange 
rate fluctuations are usually perceived as cost shocks for a foreign firm producing in its home 
coxmtry and selling in its export market. When the exchange rate changes, the import price 
responses in the range of the complete pass-through, as the firm chooses to pass the cost 
shock fully into its selling prices, to no pass-through, as the firm absorbs the shock fiilly into 
its markup. The partial pass-through refers to some of the above combination'. 
Recent study of the pass-through has drawn heavily on models of industrial 
organization, based on the convexity property of demand schedules, and focused on the role 
of market structure as well as product differentiation. Factors stressed to explain the market 
structure include the degree of competition, product substitutability, adjustment costs, or 
market quantity shares. In Dombusch(1987)'s model of Coumot competition between 
foreign and domestic sellers, for instance, the effect of a dollar appreciation on the dollar 
price of a tradable good becomes higher the more competitive the industry and the larger the 
total import share^. Current literature also suggests that the degree of pass-through varies 
across industries in explaining pricing adjustments following exchange rate changes. 
Incomplete pass-through occurs if demand becomes more elastic as price increases (e.g., 
Feenstra: 1989; Marston: 1990). However, measuring pass-through, solely depending on 
the convexity, possesses a number of problems: there is no information relevant to the timing 
of price responses and to the market structure lying behind the different responses of 
suppUers (Mennon: 1995). 
Some PTM studies are exclusively concerned with the specific structiu-e of firm's 
output market, rather than with the convexity itself. Feenstra et al. (1996), for example, 
considered the magnitude of market quantity shares of exporters in pass-through 
phenomenon and found a weak non-linear relationship in US automobile import market 
between the two variables. Gron and Swenson (1996) contributed to the literature by 
estimating the coefficient while controlling for some degree of local (or destination) 
production, which may vary by destinations and influence the inferences drawn regarding 
pricing behavior. A recent paper by Yang (1997) suggests that, based on an adapted Dixit-
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Stiglitz model, pass-through is larger the more differentiated (or less substitutable) the 
products in an industry, and the smaller the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output. 
Some theoretical papers, on the other hand, heavily depend on the game aspect of the players' 
strategic interactions in examining the dynamic nature of imperfect competition in the 
determination of pass-through level (e.g., Meckl: 1996; Pick and Carter: 1994). 
Pass-through analysis in this paper focuses on the interactions between market and 
importing prices. This paper is organized as follows. In section n, some testable 
implications are drawn about pass-through related to the market structure: pass-through is 
overall adversely determined by the firm's markup level or its factors attributing to the firm's 
competitive pressure in the industry. From the perspective of the foreign firm's price 
interactions with the market price (say p*), pass-through tends to be greater for a firm whose 
price is decided as being exogenous to p*, followed by the firm of leading p*, than that of 
taking p*. In addition to the price conjecture, pass-through is also negatively related to the 
firm's relative price to p*, and positively related to the degree of product substitutability. 
Second, this paper offers an empirical example of pricing behavior of imported beer in 
the US firom 1979 to 1988, focusing on the price interactions. The sample period was 
known as two distinctive eras of US dollar appreciation and depreciation, and each era had 
persisted for prolonged time-periods. Existence of such time-lags is often required for 
exporters to have the incentive for price discrimination or destination-specific price 
adjustment (Levin: 1994). The beer exporters are supposed to have some degree of 
monopoUstic market power, due to product differentiation, while exhibiting fair degrees of 
fluctuations in their market shares. As a diagnostic step, a VAR analysis is first performed 
to figure out the price interactions. Because there are open debates over the stability of 
pass-through level in a time-varying manner, a Kalman Filter methodology is used to 
investigate potential structural changes in parameters, and thus to capture the dynamics of 
price adjustments to changes in exchange rate, as well as other related components. 
Estimation results show that beer prices of German and Dutch exporters exhibit considerable 
exogenity to the US market price, while Canadian beer price strictly follows p*. 
Coefficients are generally estimated in the way predicted in the theoretical section supporting 
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our model, and are mostly stable over the sample period. Section HI describes the empirical 
application in a detail. 
n. AN OLIGOPOLY MODEL FOR PASS-THROUGH ANALYSIS 
n.l An Extended Dudt-Stiglitz Model 
The purpose of this analysis is to investigate the relationship between exchange rate 
pass-through and ohgopoly price leadership. The basic model assimiption is that domestic 
and foreign firms are competing in the domestic market, say within the US, with 
differentiated products that belong to a well-defined industry category. The theoretical 
firamework follows the extended Dixit-Stiglitz model introduced by Dombusch(1987) to 
capture the strategic interactions in the industry as perceived by the individual price-setting 
firm. The major theoretical difference is that this paper provides specific solutions to the 
model of pass-through in section n.2, which offers some implications for empirical testing 
relevant to foreign suppliers' price interactions with the market price (p*). This article also 
relates the firm's markup level to the degree of its competitive pressure in the market, while 
Dombusch focuses on the number of domestic and foreign firms which are identical in each 
group as an indicator of market competitiveness. 
The profit of a foreign supplier i, without time-subscripts, can be expressed as 
(1) Ttiipi, p~' ;I,z) = Pi • qiip; I)-ri- ; z) , 
where p is the vector of all prices (p;, p"'), Pj is the price charged by suppUer i in the 
domestic market, measmred in US dollars, p"' is a vector of prices charged by all other firms, 
qi is the quantity demand schedule faced by firm i, which is a function of all prices( p) and 
the income level(I). z refers to a vector of long-run input costs, and the short-run cost is 
assxmied to follow a Leontiff process with respect to q;, so that its marginal and average cost 
are the same at a constant level (cj, where Cj is denoted in its own currency (say Deutsche 
Mark: DM), r; stands for the nominal exchange rate measured as buyer's currency per unit 
of exporter's currency (e.g., doUars/DM). 
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For a single-period game between price-setting players who produce homogeneous 
products, the Nash strategy leads to the famous Bertrand paradox of no pure profits earned, or 
no market power being exercised. The paradox occurs because of the incentive for each 
player to ofifer a lower price in order to secure a certain market share for their products, hi 
the case of differentiated products within the same group, the optimal strategy chosen in this 
game by Bertrand competitors is to price at the following, treating the prices of the other 
players as being fixed at the decision time-period: 
Pi - ~~ , is the (positive) elasticity of demand; —— indicates the 
f , - !  4?,  -1  
associated markup of the exchange rate-adjusted price over the short-run marginal cost. 
If we define to be 1/(1-p), where p is the degree of product substitutabiUty in the 
industry in the range of (0, 1), then the optimal relationship becomes p, = / p. The 
markup for the representative firm increases as p decreases in a less substitutable way. This 
condition is used in most previoiis PTM literature for their econometric model (e.g., Feenstra 
et al.: 1996; Gagnon: 1994). The strategy, however, restricts the potential price interactions 
between players; i.e., each imperfectly competitive firm assumes it is sufficiently small so 
that its own price changes leave the industry price unchanged. 
The point of any price interaction model is that commitments or changes in a price 
matter to the market price because of their influence on the rival's actions. To incorporate 
pricing interactions in players' decision-makings, the first-order-condition for a profit-
maximizing suppher should be written as 
(2) qi+{pi-riCi)- = 0, i9£j, i,j=l,... ,n 
There have been numerous studies on the issue of price interaction. From a reahst's point 
of view, price interactions are not simply a modus operandi designed to circumvent strategic 
pricing conduct: they can, instead, be an inevitable consequence in many industries (e.g., 
Deneckere and Kovenock: 1992; Rotemberg and Saloner; 1990). 
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To relate the oligopoly pricing conduct directly to the issue of the incomplete pass-
through of exchange rates, we need an explicit expression for the blanked term in the optimal 
condition Eq. 2. Given the difficulty of identifying individual responses for all other 
players, we may adapt the extended Dixit-Stiglitz model introduced by Dombusch in the 
following way. The original Dixt-Stiglitz (1977) model, where product substitutability 
determines demand elasticity, postulates Chamberlinian imperfect competition and hence 
each supplier assumes that he does not affect industry price. Dombusch however extended 
the model so that the same structure of differentiated products can easily be adapted to 
introduce the strategic interaction by way of a conjectural variation. His model assumes a 
number of identical domestic firms and a nimiber of identical foreign firms to measure the 
degree of competitiveness in the market, but this paper generalizes the model into that of n 
number of heterogeneous suppliers. 
The initial Dixit-Stiglitz model postulates that a representative consumer's preference 
consists of a number of subutility functions that have the property of homogeneous functional 
separability so that a two-stage maximization procedure is consistent. Each sub-utility 
function resembles the model with differentiated products belonging to the same industry (or 
product category) as arguments. We focus hereafter on one such industry. For the 
industry, the total demand (Q) is expressed as Q =(Z^f)"''; 0 < p <1. The consumer's 
budget constraint for consimiing products in this industry is p*Q = 11 PiQi , where p* is the 
utility-based market price index for commodity Q. Maximization of the utility subject to 
the budget constraint yields the demand for each individual brand, as well as the specific 
form for p*, as follows: 
( p * ^  (?) q,=Q-— 
\ P i  
g= l/(l-p), g> 1 
(4) p* = (SA'r ; h = -p/(l-p): he(-oo,0). 
Our interest in this paper is on the responses of prices, the inverse demands, to cost 
shocks such as exchange rate fluctuations. Eq. 3 is the demand curve faced by an 
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imperfectly competitive firm, with the relative price of its product p/p* as the determinant. 
The extended model assumes that an individual firm's price decision may affect the industry 
price in a certain level, and that the firm responds to changes in p*. The response is 
measured by a given conjecture term. Maximization of the profit fimction subject to Eqs. 3 
and 4 thus yields a simplified expression for Eq. 2 as 
s- is the total demand elasticity related to the blanked term in Eq. 2, and the demand 
curve faced by an individual foreign firm is then no longer proportional to a constant markup 
over unit cost. Its markup (A^) is a fimction of p and the conjectural variation 0,, which 
captures the strategic interaction between firms as perceived by the individual price-setting 
firm. Note that assuming a given conjecture rather than deriving it from a dynamic game-
theoretic firamework is obviously a shortcut. Nor is there any concern here with ca single 
conjectural variation in the industry level; i.e., Gj is a firm-specific parameter and is a fimction 
of dp * Idpi and Pil p* for any i = 1, ..., n. 
II.2. Pass-Through Analysis 
Based on Eq. 5, we are now able to determine the effect of a change in the exchange 
rate on the import price. Differentiating the equation yields the following 
(5) p, A=-r-r-
- 1  dp, p* 
1 ( Jlng,. ^1"' 
This expression shall be defined as the 'pass-through' elasticity (tij) of the exchange rate, 
which must be positive firom the second-order conditions of profit-maximization (Feenstra et 
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al). The equation shows that pass-through depends on factors consisting of the firm's 
markup as well as the partial derivative , the percentage change in total demand 
yin/7, 
elasticity (SjO with respect to changes in the logarithm of Pj. Further, an incomplete pass-
through must be observed if the sign of is negative. Eq. 6.1 is another way of 
d ] n p .  
expressing the pass-through, following Marston (1990). If demand in the importing region 
exhibits constant price elasticity, complete pass-through must be observed. However, if the 
demand elasticity (si) increases as the importing coimtry's currency depreciates, there will 
be less than complete pass-through firom the equation 
(6.1) 7, = 1 - 1 
r ^ ]ns! 
^Inr  I J 
We may draw a number of meaningful implications fi-om Eq. 6 and 6.1 under 
reasonable restriction(s) regarding pass-through. The magnitude of pass-through rij is a 
function of three parameters in this model: degree of conjecture <5^ */J/?,, relative price ratio 
to the market price pJ p*, and degree of substitution among the variants p. Holding 
^d\Re.^ 
d\np, 
to be a positive constant^, Eq. 6 will yield the following relationship: 
(7) drji 
dp* 
. ^ P i. 
<0,  4^<0,  ^>0.  
Pi dp 
Eq. 7 overall indicates that pass-through is negatively affected by the degree of foreign 
firm's competitive pressure in the industry. Prices are strategic or choice variables, and 
dp * Idpi indicates the firm i's industry-wise price conjecture, given the price ratio p/p*. 
The implication due to changes in 0; (= (dp * I dp^)( pJ p*)) is related to the firm's market 
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price interaction. As will be explained later, what happens then is that pass-through 
elasticity tends to be lower for a taker of market price (p*) than the leader of p*. The level 
of Tij is also higher than that of p*-taker, if the supplier's pricing is perceived to be exogenous 
to p* in the market. For a firm with a low p/p* (or a small markup level), its Tij level tends 
to be larger as it faces less competitive pressure. An increased level of p also decreases the 
industry maricup, forcing the individual firm to increase Tij, being close to one, and this is the 
most popular result of previous literature based on elasticity approach (For a detailed review, 
see Menon). 
The conjecture term, or its elasticity 0;, points out whether, as p; increases, the market 
or remaining rivals cooperate to a certain degree in raising price (if the i-th firm is a p*-
leader), or do not cooperate at all and compete for the firm's whole market share (if a strict 
p*-taker), or respond only a little to changes in p; (if exogenous-to-p*). Generally speaking, 
changes in p; should be positively related to reactions in J. pj because they are strategic 
complements to each other; i.e., the assumption of non-decreasing return to scale in each 
finn's profit function ensures the positive slope of reaction functions as well as Bertrand 
equilibriimi (Shapiro: 1989). To relate 0; to a mark-up approach, because pricing decisions 
are interdependent, we may represent each firm's pricing policy in terms of a price reaction 
function: = r^c- • (p- / p*, a-, p), where cT; (= {dp^ / dp*) • (^ •//?,)) in the markup factor 
(Ai) is the conjectural variation that measures the firm' response to changes in p* in elasticity 
term. The two terms are positively related to each other, assuming dlnpj I dlap* for 
all j other than the i-th supplier, as follows*: 
Hooper and Mann (1979) specified the markup factor A^ in Eq. 5 as 
{p * )]"' • , which can be used as an illustration for the implication of conjectural 
variation. Oj and p, are constant terms in (0,1) range; indicates the degree of competitive 
pressiire faced by the foreign firm, which is conceptually equivalent to CTj in Eq. 7.1, and CUj 
< 1. 
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is the capacity utilization level of the firm as a measure of demand pressure on the output. 
The pricing equation Eq. 5 then becomes, after taking logarithm, 
(8) ln/7, = (l-a,)ln/;+ar, ln/7*+(l-Qr,)lnc,+/?, InCt/, . 
This specification shows that the pass-through will be zero for a firm which is strictly 
following the market price, since a; becomes one. Holding CUj unchanged, the p*-taker 
sets the price equal to the p* and changes in exchange rate and production cost have no 
effect. This means that the firm fully absorbs the shock in the exchange rate or foreign costs 
into its markup. At the opposite extreme, full level of Tij will be observed with a negligible 
competitive pressure in terms of p*. This indicates that the firm's pricing decision is 
insensitive or separable to p*, and its markup is left imchanged. A moderate p*-leader will 
pass-through at the level between two types and, finally, if the firm is the sole monopoly in 
the market, its pass-through will resemble that of p*-taker because the firm is simply the 
market price setter. 
In correspondence to the specification of Eq. 8, Figure 1.1 roughly shows the impact of 
dollar appreciation for a moderate p*-leader using pricing reaction functions. The schedules 
Rj and R* denote reaction functions of the i-th foreign supplier and of the market, and A<, is 
the initial equilibrium. An appreciation (i.e., a decrease in rj will shift the foreign 
1. p*-leader 2. Two extremes in price leadership 
Figure 1. Reaction fractions 
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supplier's reaction function up and to the left, and given the initial relative prices (i.e., along 
the OR-ray), OBq/OAq represents the percentage appreciation. The new equilibrium will be 
somewhere on A,Bo, depending on the response of p* due to appreciation. In Figure 1.2, the 
strict p*-taker at one extreme will set the price along the relative price ray, which will be a 45 
degree-ray if products are homogenous, while absorbing cost shocks completely into its 
markup (Aj) to maintain its relative price ratio to the given p*. A firm behaving perfectly 
exogenous to p*, on the other extreme, perceives a; to be zero and dp * I dp^ to be close-to-
zero, and thus, its pricing reaction is independent to changes in p*, implying the complete 
pass-through®. 
m. EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE 
The objective of this empirical apphcation is to test the vaUdity of the implications 
drawn in our theoretical section, focusing especially on the price interactions. Armington-
type suppliers are adopted, and the data used are quarterly observations from 1979 to 1988 in 
three beer-exporting coimtries such as Canada, Germany, and Netherlands, to the US. The 
sample period is known as two distinctive periods of USS appreciation, or strong US dollars, 
during the early 80s and depreciation during the late 80s. The import price data® are unit 
values in US dollars. Exchange rate data are nominal rates and marginal cost data are 
proxied by 'wholesale price index' from International Financial Statistics. The changes in 
nominal exchange rates for the three suppliers are shown in Graph 1, indicating the strongest 
USS against Deutsche-Mark or Dutch-Guilders at around the second quarter of 1985 and 
against Canadian-dollar at 1986:1. Further, Table 1 below reports the summary statistics of 
import and market prices, and suppliers' market quantity shares. 
Unit costs have increased in a fairly stable manner for all three major foreign suppliers 
throughout the whole sample period. For the market quantity shares, German exporters 
have managed only 10 % of the total foreign supply, but firmly maintained the level for the 
10 sample years at the highest average price. Dutch exporters also have charged high 
prices, closely behind the German, with the highest market shares among foreign suppliers 
who have seen a slight decline from high-40 (first half of the sample) to low-40 % (second 
half). Consvimption on Canadian beers has on the other hand slightly increased from 
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GM-Mark 
Guilders 
0.2 
Graph 1. Nominal exchange rates 
Table 1. Summary statistics of US beer import maricet 
(average values and standard deviations in parentheses) 
Canada German Netherlands 
Import Price (pj 2.39 (.401) 3.87 (.537) 3.66 (.389) 
Import Price-a' 1.49 (.057) 2.23 (.205) 2.12 (.364) 
Pi / P*' .697 (.035) 1.04 (.07) .987 (.157) 
Quantity Share^ .313 (.049) .102 (.016) .448 (.057) 
Unit Cost'' 1.07 (.112) 1.74 (.115) 1.81 (.138) 
1. Import Price-a denotes the import price adjiisted by the US consumer price index. 
2. Because we use the indexed data for average market price (p*), the initial p*( 1979:1) is set equal to the 
initial mean of inqjort price. The mean and standard deviation in parentheses of p* and P*-a are 3.074 
(.362) and 2.142 (.058) respectively. 
3. Quantity shares over total import quantity 
4. Since marginal cost data is proxied by the 'wholesale price index', the initial observation (1979:1) is set to 
.5 of p/rj of the same time period so that iTiitial markup ratio is .5. 
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Graph 2. Import price changes relative to market price (p; / p*) 
around-30 to mid-30 % during the same time periods. To visualize relative price changes 
of foreign suppliers. Graph 2 plots the ratio of export price (pj to the US market price (p*) 
over the sample period. A rough look at the graph gives us an idea that, unlike other 
suppliers, the relative export price of Dutch beer appears to follow fluctuations of exchange 
rates, implying a potentially very high pass-through of exchange rate as well as cost shocks. 
As a diagnostic step, we use the VAR methodology to figure out the price interactions 
between foreign suppliers' prices as well as market price (p*). The non-structural VAR 
approach has the desirable property, in examining the interrelationship among a set of 
economic variables, that all variable price series are treated symmetrically, so that we rely 
neither on any incredible identification. From the results of the estimation, Canadian beer 
exporters appear to be a strict follower to p* as well as to their own past price shocks. Two 
European prices, however, appear to be separated to p* in some degree, even though they 
tum out to be non-exogenous to the whole price system. The analysis also gives one an idea 
that the beer price in the US market overall is insignificantly related to prices of import beer. 
Details of the estimation and more discussions are reported in Appendix 2. 
For the estimation model, optimal price pj depends on exchange rateCrJ, marginal 
cost(ci), all other pricesCp "), and income level(I) from the first-order condition Eq. 5: 
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Pi =A(ri Ci,pM)-
The theoretical model that we have specified however is restrictive in that it imposes the 
same pass-through rate of exchange rate and foreign cost. Many literatures also employed 
restricted versions, even with a cross-estimate restriction for competitors' prices with respect 
to pass-through (e.g., Gagnon and Knetter: 1994; Feenstra et al.). Exchange rates tend to be 
more fluctuating over time than production cost or the domestic market price. Firms may 
be more willing to absorb changes in exchange rates (under the expectation of transitory 
changes) into their profit margins than to absorb changes in costs or the competitors' price. 
In the empirical model, we thus estimate the most relaxed version of the model without 
imposing any cross-coefficient restriction among the three key explanatory variables of r^, Cj, 
and p". 
We also find that, with very few exceptions, most variables involved do contain unit 
roots and, as a result, the first-difference series (denoted as A) for all variables are used in this 
estimation. With time subscripts, the system of equations we estimate, for each supplier, is: 
(9) A//7., = +<9,., - Mr,, + • Ale, , + 0,,^ • Alp +0,,, - A//,,, +0,,^ • Alp,,_,. 
The notation denotes the logarithm of the corresponding variable. The coefficients 
and 6,;., are the pass-through elasticity and price-to-unit cost elasticity respectively in Eq. 6 
and 6.1, which we expect to be in the range of [0,1], and 83^ indicates price elasticity to 
market price. For the total income level or capacity utilization, we instead use quantity 
demanded (say q^^J as a proxy. Due to deUvery and sales process, there exist certain time-
lags for exchange rate pass-through, or price adjustment to cost shocks; the lags usually take 
less than a half year (Menon). For this reason, some studies adapted weighted sum of 
current and past series for ri,(e.g., Kim: 1990). The weighting scheme is however avoided 
in this paper due to the possible multi-collinearity problem. We instead include the one-
period lagged dependent variable Ato capture the time-lag effect. 0oi,t is an intercept 
term that captures differences in price changes between suppliers, and perhaps over time 
periods, that are not explained by the regressors of our model. 
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There are open debates over the responses in pass-through elasticity (rij) with respect to 
changes in rj (as well as Cj and p*) in a time-varying manner. To capture potential 
dynamics. Graph 3 plots test statistics for the recursive residual tests via ordinary least square 
(OLS) estimations for Eq. 9 to see whether parameters are consistent throughout the whole 
sample period. The outcomes of the OLS regressions are reported in Table A. 1 of 
Appendix 1. The test statistics follow the student t-distribution: being higher than 2 or so, 
they indicate that corresponding recursive residuals lie outside the standard error bands, 
which in turn are suggestive of parameter inconstancy^. As shown in the graph, suspicions 
over the constancy are unavoidable in some pricing equations, especially for Canada. Test 
values for German prices on the other hand show the most fair levels of stability over the 
sample period. 
6.00 
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0.00 
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Graph 3. Test for parameter inconstancy 
(suggestive of parameter inconstancy for t-statistics greater than 1.7 at 95% confidence level) 
For a time-varying parameter regression, the Kalman Filter is a highly useful method 
for investigating structural changes in parameters or constructing forecasts based only on 
historical data. The estimation method is a recursive or an updating method that bases the 
regression estimates for each time period on previous period's estimates plus the information 
for the current time period. With the initial conditions Eq. 10.3 on parameters, this class of 
models consists of two parts: the transition equation Eq. 10.1, which describes the evolution 
Dulch 
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of a set of state variables, and the measxirement equation Eq. 10.2, which describes how the 
data actually observed is generated from the state variables. Once a model is in state space 
form, a backward recursion, known as smoothing, enables optimal estimators of the state 
vector to be calculated at all points in time using the full sample. 
In the present study, we suppose that the import price pj^^ for all three suppliers is 
generated by the following system of three equations of Eq. 9: 
(10.1) y, = X;a, , u, ~ NID(0, crH) 
(10.2) a, = a,_, + V, , v, ~ NE)(0, a^Q) 
(10.3) ao~ N(ao,{T^Po) -
yt is the 3nxl vector of A/p^ for i=l,..,3, n is the number of observations, is the 3mx3n 
matrix of the regressors in Eq. 9, where m is the number of regressors in the measurement 
equation, which is 3 in our example, a, is 3mxl vector of coefBcients to be estimated, and 
we suppose that it follows a multivariate random walk with no drift, as in Eq. 10.2. Eq. 
10.3 is about the initial parameter condition. And, o^Q is the stationary variance-covariance 
matrix of the innovation v, in the transition equation, which is mutually and serially 
uncorrelated with the innovation u, in the measurement equation. 
The system, Eqs. 10.1-10.3, is called as the multivariate random-walk parameter 
model, and it takes the form of a state-space model (See Ch. 7, Harvey: 1981). The model 
differs from the auto-regressive scheme in that the parameters are allowed to vary over time. 
Because the process is non-stationary, has no fixed mean and so the model is able to 
accommodate fairly fimdamental changes in structure, including radical changes in the 
underlying relationship. Among the applicable algorithms for the space-state form, the 
Kalman-filter approach provides a convenient means in estimating the trajectory of a,. It 
however requires an important step to find or determine the system matrices necessary for the 
estimation, such as the vector of prior coefBcient, and variance-covariance matrices PQ-, 
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H-, and Q-matrix. The following procedures, similar to Kim (1990), are adapted in this 
paper for the appropriate values. 
For the vector of tto, since the transition equation is not stationary, the initial conditions 
are not given as part of the model specification: they are simply estimated fi'om the first k 
(which is 6) observations in this paper, similar to the OLS recursion. To find Q-matrix, 
prior information could be used as in Cooley and Prescott (1973). Without it, Harvey (1981) 
proposed the maximirai likelihood estimation. But the suggested method involves 
estimation of 18^ elements in the matrix even in this simple model. Some papers, such as 
Wolff (1987) and Kim, suggest that the Q-matrix is approximated by a certain fixed 
proportion (say |x) of the variance-covariance matrix (say VC,) of the OLS estimation in 
different ways. There is, however, no clear theoretical justification either for an appropriate 
value of fi or for the procedure of letting Q to be proportional to the matrix. In this paper, 
the Q-matrix is alternatively obtained using the variance-covariance matrix from the 
recursive least squares. Recursive estimation is an appealing procedure with time series 
data, since this gives a imique ordering of the data in visualizing parameter changes. Doing 
it this way, it still embodies the assumption, as captured in VC„ that parameter variation 
tends to reflect uncertainty and correlation in parameter estimates. 
Also, the recursion can be regarded as a special case of the Kalman filter. That is 
because the associated transition equation is simply a special case of the system (e.g., a^=a^. 
„ where Q= From the recursive outcomes, the expectation E,.,(a, -a,_i) will be zero-
vector, and its variance of the random walk process shall be approximated to crQ. To take 
care of the contemporaneous correlation among coefficients, we run the seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) for the 18 series of } for j=l,.., 18 with constant terms, which 
are supposed to be zero, and the 18x18 variance-covariance matrix(say VCj) is used as a 
proxy for a^Q in Eq. 10.2. cr in the system will be estimated by running the Kalman-filter 
because we don't have prior information on or; the trace of the variance-covariance matrix 
(say ) of the SUR estimation of Eq. 9 is, however, applied to Q-matrix as a proxy for cr; 
i.e., Q= (1/(T^ )• VC,. And finally, for o^H-matrix of the measiurement equation, we use 
the 3x3 residual variance-covariance matrix of the SUR estimation of Eq. 9 to capture the 
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Table 2. Kalman-Fiiter Estimation (81:1 -88:4) 
(*. **. statistically significant at 95. 99% confidence level) 
Parameters Dependent Variables 
A/pi A/p: A/p3 
00 4.88E-03 4.74E-03 2.94E-03 
01 0.097 0.098 * 0.193 * 
02 0.392 0.963 •• 0.43 
03 I.2I * -0.394 -0.198 
04 0.036 0.027 * -9.2E-03 
05 -0.547 ** -0.182 0.483 •• 
Note; Variance of recursive residuals is .00274 and parameter estimates are of the average observations. 
contemporaneous correlation in the three pricing equations. The correlation between 
dependent variables A/pi.t is also reported in Figure A3.b in Appendix 2. 
The regression outcomes are summarized in Table 2 for the Kalman Filler estimation, 
while the parameter estimates are of the average observations. We completely list the 
trajectories of 6 smoothed coefficients in the three pricing equations of the system in Table 
A.2 of Appendix 1. As predicted from the recursive residual tests, coefficients for Canadian 
pricing equation are somewhat unstable over the sample period. Otherwise, most 
trajectories overall appear to be fairly stable, without notion of dramatic changes. One may 
catch this idea on the stability from the VAR analysis described in Appendix 2. in which 
Canadian prices are supposed to be highly subject to fluctuations in the market price p*. 
Table 3 shows the average statistics of all long-run elasticities, which are obtained after 
adjusting the lagged coefficient terms of dependent variables. For instance, pass-through 
elasticity (riLRi) is derived as 0 ii/(l-0 5,)). The average short-run elasticities are simply the 
coefficient trajectories estimated. Graph 4 plots the long-run elasticities for all three major 
foreign suppliers on the sample time horizon. 
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Table 3. Summary of long-run elasticity 
(Standard deviations in parentheses) 
Variables Canada German Netherlands 
Exchange Rate 
Cost 
.061 (.145) 
.252 (.088) 
.783 (.006) 
.023 (.013) 
.157 (.116) 
.083 (.01) 
.815 (.014) 
-.332 (.021) 
.023 (.001) 
.449 (.003) 
.374 (.012) 
.835 (.033) 
-.383 (.031) 
-.018 (.004) 
.605 (.015) 
Market Price (p*) 
Quantity 
ri + Ci^ 
1. Long-run pass-through elasticity of exchange rate. 
2. Pass-through elasticity under the restriction of same responses of price to exchange rate and to production 
The statistical significance reported in Table 2 overall coincides with the result of the 
VAR analysis. In the VAR, Canadian beer exporters are analyzed to follow the market 
price strictly, while their US market markups absorb fluctuations in nominal exchange rates 
and production costs. The tables of the estimation also show that, among the big three 
exporters, only Canadian suppliers exhibit considerable degree of sensitivity toward changes 
in p* and insensitivity to ri and c i. On the other hand, the market price has even negative 
effect which is statistically insignificant, on import prices from Dutch and German suppliers, 
potentially suggesting the separated demand for these products. The European suppliers 
are, however, quite responsive to fluctuations in exchange rate and cost in their pricing 
decision, indicating their ability to maintain the markup to be stable in fair levels in the US 
beer market. Finally, the coefficients on the quantity term are small and statistically 
insignificant in most pricing equations. 
From Table 2, the coefficients estimated suggest that the short-run effect of a 100 
percent appreciation (depreciation) of the US dollar is to decrease (raise) import price to 
9.7(Canada), 9.8(German), and 19(Dutch) percent. With respect to costs, the price changes 
are 39(Canada), 96(German), and 43 (Dutch) percent. The long-run elasticities, reported in 
cost shocks. 
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Table 3, are obtained after adjusting lagged effects of dependent variables. Note that the 
long-run effects are greater (smaller) for Dutch (Canada and German) in absolute term. For 
Canada and German, this imphes decreased sensitivity to changes in r; and c i, and decreased 
p*-taking behavior io the longer term: Dutch on the other hand exhibits short-run price 
rigidity in the market and slowly adjusts to shocks in the longer period. From Table 3, the 
results on pass-through suggest that the long-run effect of a 100 percent appreciation of the 
US dollar is to decrease import prices 6.1 (for Canadian products) to 37.4 (for Dutch 
products) percent, suggesting substantially less than full pass-through. Price elasticity with 
respect to imit cost changes is, however, much greater than pass-through (tilw) for all 
suppUers (e.g., 25% for Canada to 84% for Dutch). 
Exporters, then, seem to perceive changes in costs to be more permanent in effect than 
exchange rate fluctuations (e.g., Yang; Hooper and Mann). Some previous literature (e.g., 
Gagnon and Knetter) restrict the model to have the same coefficients with respect to ri and c i. 
But these unequal responses require one to distinguish the two types of shocks in pricing 
decisions and show the possible importance of the issue on how the market perceives 
changes in stochastic exchange rates; that is, the permanent versus transitory effects. In 
sum, Dutch exporters exhibit the highest elasticity of pass-through, followed by German and 
Canada, while the two European exporters transfer very high percent of their cost shock (82-
84%) to the price. The levels of these elasticities therefore are higher for exporters being 
exogenous-to-p* behavior, thus supporting the theoretical implication on the price 
interactions. 
The stable shape of the time-series in Graph 4 in general suggests the stability of pass-
through (e.g., Kim) in our example. That is, we observe little fluctuations for the two 
European exporters, but a Uttle tendency of increased pass-through to ri and Ci as prolonged 
depreciation of US dollar has squeezed markup level in the mid- to late-80s. Canadian 
estimates show no fluctuations to p* at all, again implying its high and significant 
dependency on p* in its price determination. Although statistically insignificant, Canadian 
prices show somewhat unstable responses to changes in rj and q. The underlying cause is 
not clear, but we noticed that trajectories of 0oi reported in Appendix 1 have fluctuated in the 
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Graph 4. Long-run elasticity for three major exporters (81:1-88:4) 
(r, c, p* denote the price elasticity with respect to rj, q, p* respectively) 
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opposite way to the elasticities. In other words, an increase in the constant term 0oi of Eq. 9 
implies that the offer price responds less to its level as explained by the model 
regressors, or that the supplier is willing to price higher than the level decided by the market 
conditioned by explanatory variables. It is presimiably natural to exhibit the time-varying 
constant term for Canadian suppliers, who have taken most fluctuations in markup with the 
least pass-through of exchange rates and cost shocks. 
It should be admitted that the stability of pass-through shall be an open question, 
heavily depending on industries and market conditions. During the dollar depreciation, 
import prices may respond more strongly if the decline in the dollar takes place against a 
background of profit margins that are being squeezed significantly by, for example, a strong 
rebound in prices of oil and other materials (Hooper and Mann). Further, the strong 
rebound in pass-through may also happen if foreign suppliers, without facing severe 
domestic competition, strengthen their collusive level to maintain the squeeze in a small 
level. These possibilities should be uncommon in our example of the US beer industry, 
where foreign supplies do not lead or considerably affect the market price overall. 
Applying Hooper and Mann's specification of markup, the degree of each supplier's 
competitive pressure is measured as —— , where A, is the markup and b, ]nA.+log(j>*/ p,) 
stands for Pi InCUi in the range of (-1,0), as in Eq. 8. This is a restricted version in the 
sense that it forces the same elasticity, say RIJ*, to r, and CJ, and 1-TI,* to p*. However, 
following the specification, the competitive pressure in our example, for Canada, German, 
and Dutch exporters is estimated respectively as .823, .257, and .133 in the long-nm in 
average. This again imphes that Dutch, closely followed by German, exporters have acted 
as if they were mostly exogenous-to-p* with least competitive pressure in the market. 
Finally, the result of smaller Ti(Gertnan) than r|(Dutch) is possibly due to the higher competitive 
pressure meastired in this maimer, which is also implied by higher relative price (p/p*). 
Furthermore, the high pass-through of Dutch might be a reason for its gradual loss of the US 
market share over the sample period. 
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IV. CONCXUDING REMARKS 
The analysis of pass-through determines the likely effects on import prices of shocks in 
exchange rates. Recent study of the pass-through have drawn heavily on models of 
industrial organization and focused on the impact of market structure on the foreign firm's 
behavior. Besides emphasizing the convexity of demand schedules, existing literature also 
suggests that the degree of pass-through varies across industries, and that the variation relates 
to market structure such as market competition level, degree of product differentiation, 
adjustment costs, or market quantity shares. In a similar attempt, this study relates the 
degree of oligopoly conduct on price interaction, or interactions among suppliers, directly to 
the issue of incomplete 'pass-through'. While focusing on the degree of competitive 
pressure faced by the suppliers, this paper also shows one way to apply the implications to 
our empirical example of the import beer pricing in the US. It should be admitted that 
abundant examples, rather than just the beer import market, would provide more solid 
verification for the implications. But the results of our empirical example relatively 
correspond well to the theoretical implications, and the empirical methodology used in this 
paper should be easily apphcable to other industry- or firm-level analysis. 
Another restriction of this paper is that, foUowing most pass-through literature, this 
study is a partial equilibrium model. We have defined pass-through as a partial derivative 
that reflects the willingness of foreign firms to adjust their price, and thus profit margins, to 
offset changes in exchange rates. For a future research, a more general model might take 
into account other less direct effects of exchange rates on the import price, through their 
effects of other factors determining pricing decisions. For instance, a depreciation of the 
dollar lowers the US purchasing power over the product (hence depressing foreign capacity 
utilization), or lowers foreign costs, via a reduction in input costs firom the US or in imported 
material input costs. This thereby implies that the total pass-through may be less than 
indicated by the partial derivative analyzed. Alternatively, the impact of depreciation on the 
US market price level could work in the opposite direction, to increase total pass-through, 
and thus could lead to biased estimates of the pass-through. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Studies of'pricing-to-marketTpass-through' are of interest for several reasons 
(Menon (1995) provides a good review on the topic). First, they contribute to our 
understanding of the relationship between exchange rate changes and inflation. Secondly, 
they reveal an important feature of the competitive process in traded goods markets - how 
prices respond to cost shocks over time. Finally, these studies can be used to assess the 
impact of similar disturbances, such as tariff changes, on import prices as argued by Feenstra 
(1989). 
2. Similarly, the imperfect substitutes model of de Melo and Robinson (1989) shows 
the elasticity of domestic price with respect to foreign price (and thus, indirectly, with respect 
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to cuirency movements) to be directly related to both import share and degree of 
substitutability between domestic and imported goods. 
3. The elasticity of conjectural variation (6 J with respect to price(pj) shall be non-
positive as long as the reaction fimction in Figure 1 is not concave to its axis, and this 
condition is obtained from the convexity assumption of the demand curve. 
4. The relationship between 0; and is directly derived from Eq. 4. For the 
derivation, similar to Eq. 7.1, see pp. 99-100 of Dombusch, whose paper postulates n number 
of identical domestic firms and n* number of identical foreign firais. 
5. Note that the reaction fimctions as well as the equilibriimi path, is also determined 
by the level of relative price ratio (p/p*), where the inherent price difference between pj and 
p* is potentially due to product quality difference. For this reason, the firm's price 
interaction shall be measured by the conjectural variation (0; = or C7j, as shown in 
d\n.p, 
Eq. 5, in an empirical application of section HI in this paper. 
6. Beer import price data for the three major exporters are from "Exchange Rates and 
Prices: the Case of US Imports", written by Smith Jr. in 1996, and the US market (average) 
price data is from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics: CPI Detailed Report. The notes under 
Table 1 provide more detailed descriptions on the data used. 
7. Details are shown in Ch.4 of Econometric Methods, fourth edition, by Johnston and 
DiNardo (1997). 
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APPENDICES 
1. Regression Results 
Table A1. OLS estimations of Eq. 9 
(** statistically significant at 5 or a lower %) 
Parameters Deoendent 
A/pi 
Variables 
Alp2 A/p3 
00 .649E-02 -.264E-02 .451E-02 
01 .07 .053 .162 
02 .233 .325 .3651 
03 1.1 • .276 -.255 
04 .022 .011 -.71E-02 
05 -.492 ** -.225 * .519 
T- .2131 .016 .191 
SEE .0325 .02 .042 
D-h-alt(1.7, 2.5) -.942 31 .894 
F (2.9, 4.5) 3.0 o
o 00 
2.742 
Arch (4.1, 7.4) 1.243 1.343 .668 
Note: The 1,2, and 3 of dependent variables denote the suppliers of Canada, German, and Netherlands 
respectively. Figures in parentheses are critical values (5%, 1%) of the test statistic. SEE is the 
standard error of estimation. D-h-alt is the Durbin's h alternative for autocorrelation test if a regression 
contains lagged values of the dependent variable and if n*var(03) > or « 1. F is the test for zero slopes. 
Arch is Engle's autoregressive conditional hetero-scedasticity test of residuals. 
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Table A2. Trajectories of ICalman filter (Eqs. 10.1-10.3). 
(0ij refers to the j-th coefficient of supplier i, where i= 1,2,3 stands for Canada, 
German, and Dutch respectively) 
010 011 012 013 014 015 
1981:1 0.00827 -0.397 0.0794 1.167 0.0797 -0.507 
0.00813 -0.373 0.0938 1.169 0.0777 -0.509 
0.00774 -0.308 0.133 1.174 0.0719 -0.515 
0.00738 -0.258 0.165 1.178 0.0678 -0.519 
1982:1 0.00701 -0.196 0.203 1.182 0.0624 -0.525 
0.00672 -0.128 0-242 1.186 0.0563 -0.531 
0.00622 -0.0146 0.308 1.193 0.0461 -0.541 
0.00593 0.0564 0.348 1.198 0.0397 -0.547 
1983:1 0.00576 0.0675 0.357 1.2 0.0388 -0.547 
0.00556 0.0967 0.373 1.204 0.0363 -0.547 
0.00507 0.18 0.422 1.212 0.0288 -0.553 
0.00442 0.29 0.491 1.22 0.0189 -0.562 
1984:1 0.0039 0.372 0.542 1.226 0.0115 -0.57 
0.00346 0.44 0.586 1.231 0.00526 -0.576 
0.00346 0.418 0.576 1.231 0.00719 -0.574 
0.00348 0.394 0.565 1.23 0.0093 -0.572 
1985:1 0.00366 0.332 0.531 1.227 0.0149 -0.566 
0.0039 0.259 0.49 1.223 0.0215 -0.56 
0.00394 0.222 0.472 1.222 0.0248 -0.556 
0.00402 0.185 0.452 1.22 0.0281 -0.553 
1986:1 0.0041 0.168 0.444 1.219 0.0293 -0.552 
0.0044 0.101 0.406 1.215 0.0351 -0.546 
0.00462 0.0491 0.377 1.212 0.0395 -0.542 
0.00467 0.0203 0.362 1.211 0.0419 -0.539 
1987:1 0.0047 -0.0181 0.344 1.21 0.0452 -0.535 
0.00437 0.0458 0.383 1.215 0.0393 -0.541 
0.00414 0.0712 0.4 1.218 0.0368 -0.542 
0.00391 0.104 0.421 1.221 0.0338 -0.544 
1988:1 0.0037 0.154 0.45 1.224 0.0293 -0.549 
0.00329 0.257 0.509 1.23 0.0201 -0.558 
0.00324 0.25 0.506 1.231 0.0205 -0.557 
0.00312 0.257 0.512 1.233 0.0197 -0.557 
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930 931 932 933 934 935 
1981:1 0.00422 0.205 0.419 -0.215 -0.00551 0.453 
0.00413 0.204 0.42 -0.213 -0.00578 0.454 
0.00393 0.203 0.424 -0.208 -0.00646 0.455 
0.00373 0.202 0.425 -0.205 -0.00702 0.459 
1982:1 0.00353 0.201 0.426 -0.202 -0.00763 0.463 
0.00344 0.2 0.429 -0.201 -0.00795 0.465 
0.00326 0.197 0.437 -0.196 -0.00871 0.465 
0.00316 0.195 0.441 -0.193 -0.0092 0.464 
1983:1 0.00305 0.195 0.442 -0.191 -0.00948 0.466 
0.00292 0.194 0.444 -0.189 -0.00986 0.467 
0.00271 0.191 0.451 -0.184 -0.0106 0.468 
0.00245 0.189 0.458 -0.179 -0.0114 0.47 
1984:1 0.00225 0.187 0.463 -0.175 -0.012 0.472 
0.00211 0.185 0.466 -0.173 -0.0124 0.475 
0.00215 0.186 0.462 -0.176 -0.0121 0.478 
0.00221 0.186 0.457 -0.18 -0.0117 0.481 
1985:1 0.0023 0.188 0.45 -0.184 -0.0112 0.485 
0.00243 0.19 0.442 -0.189 -0.0106 0.489 
0.00247 0.191 0.437 -0.192 -0.0103 0.493 
0.00255 0.191 0.432 -0.196 -0.00989 0.496 
1986:1 0.00269 0.192 0.427 -0.2 -0.00946 0.497 
0.00291 0.193 0.419 -0.206 -0.00874 0.499 
0.00309 0.194 0.412 -0.21 -0.00816 0.501 
0.00316 0.195 0.408 -0.212 -0.00795 0.502 
1987:1 0.0032 0.196 0.403 -0.214 -0.00773 0.504 
0.0031 0.194 0.407 -0.212 -0.00808 0.506 
0.00303 0.193 0.409 -0.21 -0.00833 0.506 
0.00294 0.192 0.411 -0.208 -0.00861 0.506 
1988:1 0.00287 0.191 0.414 -0.207 -0.00887 0.507 
0.00271 0.189 0.42 -0.203 -0.00946 0.507 
0.00267 0.189 0.422 -0.202 -0.00957 0.506 
0.00263 0.188 0.423 -0.2 -0.0097 0.505 
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2. VAR Estimation for Price-Leadership 
For the examination of the interrelationship, we consider the following simple system 
of price equations: 
^Pu = c,. + I +_+ I a,^jAlp^,_. +e,, > for i=l,..,4, y=l y=I 
where ^ = first difference of the beer import price, including the market average price 
p*, from suppher i at time t, 
p = the number of lags of the endogenous variables, 
a^iq = coefficient for the k-th endogenous variable(i.e., A/p^ with the j-th lag for 
the dependent variable A/pj, 
Ci t = independently and identically distributed disturbance terms, while E(ei t, Cj J 
for all i, j, is not necessarily zero. 
There are ongoing debates over the necessity of stationary of data series in VAR 
analysis (See Enders, Ch. 5). We here use the first difference series in correspondence to 
our empirical estimation of Eq. 9. To determine the polynomial-lag length (p), each 
equation is estimated using lag lengths of 4 and 2 quarters. The AIC (Akaike Information 
Criterion) shows the preference to the model of lag-4, but the model of 2-lag is also a strong 
candidate due to its low SBIC (Schwarz Bayes Information Criterion). These values are 
reported in Table A3.b. Using X^-tests, we determine that a lag length of only 2 quarters is 
the appropriate one: we would not be able to reject the null of only 2 lags because the 
calculated statistic (40.72) is less than the 90 and 95 % of X^-tail with 35 degree of freedom. 
The variance decompositions are reported in Table A3.a and Granger-causality tests are 
in parentheses of the table. Other examinations, including the contemporaneous correlation 
between error terms, are shown below the table. A test of causality is whether the lags of 
one variable enter into the equation for another variable. The forecast error decomposition 
tells us the proportion of the movements in a sequence due to its own shocks versus shocks to 
the other variable. The correlations between iimovations are relatively low in most cases: 
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this indicates that the effect of dependent variable ordering is relatively insignificant. Based 
on the result of Granger-causality tests, we consider the variance decomposition using a 
Choleski decomposition such that p3 (Dutch export price) iimovations contemporarily affect 
all prices, p2 (German price) innovations contemporarily affect all price but p3, and 
p*(market price) innovations contemporarily affect themselves and pi (Canadian price), and 
finally p 1 iimovations contemporarily affect only p 1. 
Granger-causality tests indicate that effects of pi on its own time-series are highly 
significant, and the cross-causality effect from p* to pi is also significant at 1% level. 
Otherwise, each price weakly affects own time-series without serious cross-effects. Block-
exogeneity tests are also performed to determine the potential exogeneity of the remaining 
variables. It should be noted that the causality test is a weaker condition than the condition 
for exogeneity in determining the effect of innovations to the market price or other prices in 
the market. A block exogeneity test is useful in the decision of whether to incorporate a 
variable into a VAR. The tests, also reported in Table A3.b., tell us that lags of Pj Granger 
cause either Pj or P^, where i, j, k= 1, 2, or 3, or p*, and i'^'^k at 95% confidence level, and 
we thus conclude all prices are not exogenous to the system. 
The direction of causality from Granger tests can be also confirmed from forecast 
variance composition, which displays the percentage of forecast error explained by all price 
shocks. In sum, based on test outcomes, Canadian beer exporters appear to be a strict 
follower to p* as well as to own price shocks. Two European suppliers however appear to 
act as being exogenous-to-p* in some degree, even though they turn out to be non-exogenous 
to the whole price system. Canadian exporters are p*-takers, but, considering Block-
exogeneity test results of p*, the market price is overall determined in a manner of being less 
related to prices of foreign import beer. Especially German exhibits highly insignificant test 
results, implying that the market perceive Gennan beers to be most exogenous in pricing 
behavior, along with the observation of very stable market share around 10% in the US 
foreign beer consumption. 
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Table A3. Summary of test statistics of VAR estimation 
(** statistically significant at 99 % confidence level with test criterion 
F2^5-9 = 4.22(5%) and 7.72(1%)) 
a. Variance decomposition and Granger-causality test in parentheses 
Percent of forecast Tvpical shock in 
Error variance in PI (Canada) P2(German) P3 (Dutch) P*(market) 
PI 64.5 (10.8**) 4.5 (1.8) 10.1 (.46) 20.9 (10.4»*) 
P2 5.4 (1.16) 75.6 (3.23) 1.66(1.03) 2.5 (.15) 
P3 11.5 (2.7) 8.5 (3.95) 77.1 (3.09) 2.9 (2.65) 
P* 4.7 (1.4) 11.4 (.26) 4.2 (1.3) 79.7 (3.7) 
b. General tests 
1. Stat, for lag-length of 4 versus 2: 40.72 with d.f. 32 
2. AIC/SBIC: 11.64/3.31 for lag-length 4 
12.07/2.32 for lag-length 2 
3. contemporaneous correlation in innovations and prices: 
ei 62 63 A/Pl AIP2 AlP* 
62 .033 AIP2 .026 
63 .165 .45 A/P3 -.089 .264 
e* .096 .225 -.115 AlP* .224 .301 .034 
4. Block-exogeneity test: 
X^-testwith9d.f.: Pl(21.52), P2(20.44), P3(26.85), P*(8.23) 
with Critical value =5.99(5%) and 9.2(1%). 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Finns involved in international trade are subject to fluctuations in exchange rates as 
well as price uncertainty itself. The three papers of this dissertation deal with topics that are 
somewhat different to each other in the area of international market analysis. The main 
contribution of this dissertation is on its extension of the current literature by focusing on 
international firms' real decisions with respect to changes in financial variables or structure 
attributing to the firms' behaviors. The study deals especially with real and financial 
decision models of a risk-averse international firm when the firm faces unstable exchange 
rates over time. 
The first two papers relate the firm's ex-ante real decisions to the portfolio theory in 
correspondence to the recent attention to the issue of risk management. Chapter 1, the first 
paper, extends the analysis of the current hedging Uterature by including another realistic 
scheme, which is the diversification of importing channels of homogeneous products into 
multiple suppliers. As a result, the importing firm faces not only input price risk but also 
exchange rate uncertainty in the multiplicative form. Results and their intuitions are 
summarized in results (R1-R5) as well in three propositions. The overall implication of 
these resvdts is that the existence of currency futures matters to the decision maker because it 
is the optimal hedging level that eventually determine the bowing property or covariance 
effect of the portfolio variance. 
The second paper. Chapter 2, examines another risk-diversification model when a risk-
averse international processing firm chooses the import mixture of its major material input 
from multiple suppliers. This article extends the paper by Wolak and Kolstad in 1991 
American Economic Review. The main framework of the Chapter 2 is parallel to the idea 
of security line of the capital asset pricing model, as in their paper. The shortcomings of 
their work is, however, apparent in the sense that their approach is limited only to the 
importer's incentive to diversify away the systematic price risk, by postulating homogeneous 
products. This study assimies, instead, non-homogeneous products and also examines the 
supplier-side impact on the equilibrimn price. The theoretical section of the paper shows 
equilibrixmi relationship in the market prices among three key explanatory variables, which 
are the expected price, the systematic price risk relative to the optimal market price, and the 
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supplier's monopolistic market power. The Qiinese wheat import market is analyzed as an 
empirical application in the intemational trade. The results overall support the theoretical 
implication that the monopolistic power should be included as a critical explanatory factor. 
In sum, unless the market power of all supphers is negligible, the analysis purely depending 
on the price-based portfolio should not be a valid approach in an empirical study of real asset 
allocation such as the import diversification. 
The third paper. Chapter 3, shows how the jSrm's price leadership affects exchange rate 
pass-through. Recent smdy of the pass-through has drawn heavily on the models of 
industrial organization, based on the convexity property of demand schedules. Based on an 
extended Dixit-Stiglitz model, the paper asserts that the phenomenon of pass-through should 
be viewed within the corresponding market system, under which consvraiers and producers 
act in response to price signals generated by the interplay of supply and demand in more or 
less fireely operating markets. In other words, pass-through is adversely determined by the 
intemational firm's markup level and/or factors attributing to the firm's competitive pressure 
in the industry. This article also offers an empirical example of pricing behavior of 
imported beer in the US, focusing on the supplier's pricing interaction with the market price. 
Because there are open debates over the stability of pass-through level in a time-varying 
maimer, the Kalman-filter methodology is used to capture any potential structural change in 
parameters. Some of the shortcomings of this study are mentioned throughout as well as the 
conclusion parts of each chapter and are left for future researches. 
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